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Introduction
In June 1992, the United States Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey' struck down the trimester framework of Roe v.
Wade2 and replaced it with an undue burden standard to test the con-
stitutionality of state abortion regulations. Under this new standard,
a state restriction on abortion is invalid if it has "the purpose or effect
of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an
abortion of a nonviable fetus."4 Although one of the explicit purposes
of the Casey joint opinion in promulgating the undue burden standard
was to provide clarification to the lower courts,5 these courts today
remain largely confused about the standard's requirements and
application.
After the Casey decision, several commentators predicted that
the lower court application of the undue burden standard would be
troublesome, and criticism of the standard became widespread.6
These scholars argued primarily that Casey failed to provide sufficient
guidance and methodology for using the new standard and judges
would be allowed too much discretion in its application. Commenta-
tors predicted these problems would make the undue burden standard
unworkable in practice, engender confusion in the lower courts, in-
crease abortion litigation, result in judicial bias and speculation, and
create arbitrary and inconsistent outcomes. In fact, the greatest appli-
cation problem that arose was unpredicted: the threshold question of
whether Casey overruled the traditional Salerno test for determining
the facial constitutionality of state abortion regulations.
This Note analyzes the Casey undue burden standard as imple-
mented by the lower courts in abortion law cases,7 reviews the accu-
racy of the commentators' predictions, and examines the circuit court
split over the application of the undue burden standard and the Sa-
lerno test. Part I places the Casey undue burden standard in the
framework of developing constitutional law regarding a woman's right
1. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869-79.
4. Ld. at 877.
5. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 99-122 and accompanying text.
7. The undue burden standard has been used in contexts other than abortion regula-
tion. See generally Sandra L. Tholen & Lisa Baird, Note, Con Law Is as Con Law Does: A
Survey of Planned Parenthood v. Casey in the State and Federal Courts, 28 Loy. L.A. L.
REv. 971, 1029-36 (1995).
to choose. Part II reviews scholarly predictions of problems antici-
pated during application. Part III surveys the lower court decisions
applying Casey's undue burden standard to state abortion laws, and
evaluates the analyses used by these courts. Part IV evaluates which
of the scholarly predictions have been realized, and then summarizes
and discusses the circuit court split over whether to disregard Casey
and instead apply the Salerno test to facial challenges of state abortion
regulation. Part V concludes that the use of Salerno in abortion cases
is misplaced, and that the trend against its use will continue.
I. A Summary of the Casey Undue Burden Standard in the
Context of Supreme Court Abortion Jurisprudence
A. Background
In 1973, Roe v. Wade established that a woman has a fundamental
right to choose to terminate a pregnancy, a right which springs from
the right to privacy and a liberty interest arising under the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' To protect this right, Roe
delineated a trimester system as a brightline test of the constitutional-
ity of state abortion regulations.9 Although Roe found a woman's
right to abortion fundamental, it also held that the right is neither ab-
solute nor unqualified, and must be considered against important state
interests in abortion regulation.10 Using strict scrutiny, the Roe Court
held that any legislative enactment regulating the abortion right must
be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate government interest
at stake."
Following the Roe decision, several states enacted legislation im-
posing restrictions on a woman's right to an abortion, many of which
8. 410 U.S. 113, 152-56 (1973).
9. Id at 162-66. Justice Blackmun summarized the trimester framework as follows:
(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abor-
tion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman's attending physician.
(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses,
regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal
health.
(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the
potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abor-
tion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preser-
vation of the life or health of the mother.
Id at 164-65.
10. Id at 154. The Court further explained that "most... courts have agreed that the
right of privacy... is broad enough to cover the abortion decision; that the right.., is not
absolute and is subject to some limitations; and that at some point the state interests as to
protection of health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant." Id at 155.
11. Id at 155 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
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were subsequently found to be unconstitutional under Roe. Among
these unconstitutional restrictions were mandatory pre-abortion coun-
seling,' 2 spousal' 3 and parental notification and consent require-
ments,' 4 and abortion clinic licensing limitations.'
In the 1989 decision of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
however, a new majority of the Court signaled their willingness to up-
hold abortion restrictions.16 Three Justices expressed a desire to sig-
nificantly modify and narrow Roe.'7 One Justice called for an outright
overruling of Roe. 8 During the aftermath of the Webster decision,
several states passed new legislation to protect the life of the unborn
fetus and limit the right to an abortion.' 9
B. The Planned Parenthood v. Casey Opinion
During the wave of new state abortion legislation following Web-
ster, Pennsylvania amended its abortion statute ° to add the following
restrictions: first, a woman seeking an abortion must give her in-
formed consent prior to the abortion procedure; second, she must re-
ceive certain information at least twenty-four hours before the
12. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747 (1986) (striking down requirement that a woman must receive from the state
printed materials discouraging abortion).
13. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding a state can-
not delegate veto power to a spouse).
14. See, e.g., id. (striking down a parent's absolute veto on a minor's abortion right).
15. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983)
[hereinafter Akron 1] (striking down requirement that all second trimester abortions must
be performed in hospitals).
16. 492 U.S. 490, 520-21 (1989) (upholding viability testing and restrictions on the use
of public employees and facilities to perform or assist nontherapeutic abortions) ("There is
no doubt that our holding today will allow some governmental regulation of abortion that
would have been prohibited under the language of [prior cases]."); see Utah Women's
Clinic v. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482, 1484 (D. Utah 1994) ("Webster appeared to open up
new opportunities for states to exert an interest in protecting unborn life by imposing addi-
tional restrictions on abortion.").
17. Webster, 492 U.S. at 521 ("To the extent indicated in our opinion, we would modify
and narrow Roe and succeeding cases.") (Rehnquist, CJ., joined by White & Kennedy,
JJ.).
18. Id. at 537 ("It thus appears that the mansion of constitutionalized abortion law,
constructed overnight in Roe v. Wade, must be disassembled doorjamb by doorjamb, and
never entirely brought down, no matter how wrong it may be.") (Scalia, J., concurring).
19. See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203-3220 (1990); 1991 La. Acts 26; 1991 N.D.
Laws 141; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-301 (1991); 9 GUAM CODE ANN. § 31.20-.23 (1990)
(ruled unconstitutional by Ada v. Guam Soe'y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 962 F.2d
1366 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 506 U.S. 1011 (1992)).
20. The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. §§ 3203-3220
(1995); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 app. at 902-11 (1992) ("Selected Provi-
sions of the 1988 and 1989 Amendments to the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of
1982").
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abortion is performed; third, one parent of a minor who seeks an
abortion must give consent, and if the minor does not wish or cannot
obtain a parent's consent, she can seek a judicial bypass; fourth, a
married woman seeking an abortion must sign a statement indicating
that she has notified her husband of her intended abortion, unless a
statutorily defined exception applies; and fifth, providers of abortion
services must comply with specified reporting requirements. 21 Imme-
diately after enactment, the constitutionality of these five abortion re-
strictions was challenged in federal court,' and rose through the
Third Circuit to the United States Supreme Court.23
In Casey, the Supreme Court issued an elaborately splintered de-
cision in which the joint opinion, written by Justice O'Connor and
joined by Justices Kennedy and Souter, announced the judgment and
opinion of the Court.24 The Casey joint opinion effected three princi-
pal changes to Supreme Court abortion jurisprudence: it reaffirmed
"the essential holding of Roe v. Wade,"' 5 struck down the Roe trimes-
ter framework,26 and replaced it with a new undue burden standard.27
1. The "Essential Holding" of Roe
In reaffirming the essential holding of Roe, the joint opinion spe-
cifically upheld what Justice O'Connor described as its "three parts":
one, the right of a woman to choose and obtain an abortion before
viability without undue interference from the state; two, the state
power to restrict abortions after fetal viability, as long as exceptions to
protect a woman's life or health are provided; and three, the state
interests in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the
fetus.2 8 By discussing the essential holding of Roe as a combination of
rights and interests, the joint opinion effectively laid the groundwork
21. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
22. This suit was brought by five abortion clinics, a physician, and a class of doctors
who provided abortion services. They sought injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment
that each of the five provisions was unconstitutional on its face. Casey, 505 U.S. at 845.
23. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (striking down all
five provisions, except certain portions of the reporting requirements), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding only the spousal notification provision
unconstitutional), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
24. Casey, 505 U.S. at 843-911. The joint opinion is controlling because it is the state-
ment of the members of the Court who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest
grounds. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (explaining when a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
justices, the holding is the position taken by those justices who concurred in the judgment
on the narrowest grounds); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (same
rationale).
25. 505 U.S. at 845-46.
26. Id. at 875-76.
27. Id. at 876-79.
28. Ie at 846.
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for moving abortion jurisprudence away from a discussion of funda-
mental rights and strict scrutiny, and instead toward a balancing of
interests typical of rational basis review.
2. Roe's Trimester System
Although the Casey joint opinion retains what it considered to be
the essential principles of Roe, it explicitly rejects the trimester frame-
work as a means of testing the constitutionality of state abortion regu-
lations.29 In doing so, Justice O'Connor first explained that "the
Court's experience applying the trimester framework has led to the
striking down of some abortion regulations which in no real sense de-
prived women of the ultimate decision" of whether to terminate a
pregnancy.30 Justice O'Connor made this conclusion, however, with-
out citing any specific cases or abortion regulations.3 ' Second, Justice
O'Connor stated that in practice the trimester framework underval-
ued the substantial state interest in potential life throughout preg-
nancy by treating all government interference before viability as
unwarranted.32 Once again, these arguments demonstrate the joint
opinion's preparation for a move toward a standard more in line with
a rational basis review by highlighting the substantial nature of the
state interest and the notion that a woman's ultimate decision can be
restricted as long as it is not deprived in some "real sense. 33
3. The Undue Burden Standard
After laying this foundation, the Casey joint opinion establishes
the undue burden standard as the new test for determining the consti-
tutionality of state abortion regulations, finding it to be "the appropri-
ate means of reconciling the State's interest with the woman's
constitutionally protected liberty." 4 The joint opinion describes the
undue burden standard in the following way:
A finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion
that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a sub-
stantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid because
29. I& at 873 ("We reject the trimester framework, which we do not consider to be
part of the essential holding of Roe.") (citing Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490, 518 (Rehnquist, C.J.), 529 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (1989)).
30. Id at 875.
31. Justice O'Connor did explain however that these decisions "went too far because
the right recognized by Roe is a right 'to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child."' Id. (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
32. Id at 875-76 (citing Webster, 492 U.S. at 519 (Rehnquist, C.J.) and Akron , 462
U.S. 416, 461 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
33. Id at 875.
34. Id at 876.
the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential
life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not
hinder it. And a statute which, while furthering the interest in
potential life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman's choice
cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legiti-
mate ends.35
In short, under this new standard, a state abortion regulation will
be invalid if, "in a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is
relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice
to undergo an abortion. '36
With the promulgation of this new standard, the Casey decision
effectively abolishes the fundamental right status of a woman's right
to choose, and replaces Roe's strict scrutiny .with a "more permissive"
standard37 calling for consideration of state interests, thereby reducing
the level of review to something more akin to heightened scrutiny38 or
rational basis review.39
Additionally, the Casey undue burden standard shifts the burden
of proof from the state to the individuals challenging the regulation.4"
Previously, under Roe's strict scrutiny standard, once facial challeng-
ers had proven a restriction impacted the abortion right to any degree,
the burden shifted to the state to show that the restriction was nar-
35. Id at 877.
36. Id at 895.
37. Kathryn Kolbert & David H. Gans, Responding to Planned Parenthood v. Casey:
Establishing Neutrality Principles in State Constitutional Law, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 1151, 1154
(1993).
38. See David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudi-
cation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 641, 686-91 (1994).
39. See Elizabeth A. Schneider, Comment, Workability of the Undue Burden Test, 66
TEMP. L. REv. 1003, 1028-31 (1993).
One scholar has offered the following comment on desirability of the Casey standard
over strict scrutiny:
The alternative to an undue burden approach... may even be more limited and
restrictive. If the only choice is between protecting the exercise of a right against
all burdens under strict scrutiny review or interpreting the interest at stake as
something other than a right and providing it no constitutional protection at all,
the latter option may be selected in far too many circumstances.
Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed- The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Con-
stitutional Doctrine, 45 HASrNGs L.J. 867, 959 (1994); see also infra notes 339-342 and
accompanying text (discussing Casey's interruption of the Court's trend in a trilogy of cases
applying the stricter Salerno test to abortion law).
40. Kolbert & Gans, supra note 37, at 1155; C. Elaine Howard, Note, The Roe'd to
Confusion: Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1457, 1486 (1993). But see
Faigman, supra note 38, at 689 ("The distinct impression the joint opinion gives is that the
government had the burden of proof to show that spousal notification would not constitute
a substantial obstacle.").
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rowly drawn to serve a compelling state purpose.41 Because the abor-
tion right is no longer fundamental under Casey, challengers of
abortion laws face a weightier facial showing of unconstitutionality
than was required under Roe:42 they must prove in the first instance
that either "the legislature's purpose was to interfere substantially
with a woman's abortion choice, or that a challenged regulation would
impose a 'substantial obstacle' to the exercise of that choice."'43
a. The Upheld Provisions
Under the auspices of this new undue burden analysis, the Casey
joint opinion upheld all of the challenged Pennsylvania abortion re-
strictions except the spousal notification requirement.4 In upholding
the medical emergency definition,4 5 the joint opinion stated that if the
definition foreclosed abortions in the face of significant health risks,
"we would be required to invalidate the restrictive operation of the
provision, for the essential holding of Roe forbids a State from inter-
fering with a woman's choice to undergo an abortion procedure if con-
tinuing her pregnancy would constitute a threat to her health. ' 46 The
Third Circuit found that the Pennsylvania legislature had intended to
assure that compliance with its abortion laws would not pose a signifi-
cant threat to a woman's life or health.47 The Casey joint opinion then
upheld the Third Circuit's interpretation of the definition, stating that,
as construed, it imposed "no undue burden on a woman's abortion
41. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973).
42. See Kolbert & Gans, supra note 37, at 1154-55.
43. Id at 1155.
44. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879-80 (upholding medical emergency
definition), 881-87 (upholding informed consent provision), 887-98 (striking down spousal
notification provision), 899-900 (upholding parental consent provision), 900-01 (upholding
recordkeeping and reporting requirements) (1992).
45. The challenged statute provided the following definition of a medical emergency:
[T]hat condition which, on the basis of the physician's good faith clinical judg-
ment, so complicates the medical condition of a pregnant woman as to necessitate
the immediate abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or for which a delay
will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of major bodily
function.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (1990).
46. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879-80 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 164). The challengers argued
that the definition was too narrow and would not allow women to obtain abortions when
faced with certain significant health risks. Id. at 880. The district court found that three
health-endangering conditions fell outside the statutory exception: pre-eclampsia, inevita-
ble abortion, and prematurely ruptured membrane. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F.
Supp. 1323, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
47. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879-80. The Third Circuit construed the phrase "serious risk" to
include those health risks raised by the challengers. See iL
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right."'48 In essence, the joint opinion's analysis consisted of using the
Third Circuit's determination of legislative intent. Further, it ac-
knowledged that a legislative purpose contrary to an essential holding
of Roe constitutes an undue burden.
In upholding Pennsylvania's twenty-four hour informed consent
requirement,49 the Casey joint opinion broke down its inquiry into two
portions: the specific requirements aimed at informing the woman's
choice °5 0 and the twenty-four hour waiting period.51 With regard to
the informed consent aspect, the joint opinion concluded that "[s]ince
there is no evidence on this record that requiring a doctor to give the
information as provided by the statute would amount in practical
terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion, we
conclude that it is not an undue burden."'52 The joint opinion was in
effect unable to perform an undue burden analysis on the informed
consent provision since that analysis would have required a review of
district court findings of fact which had not been developed below.5 3
With regard to the twenty-four hour waiting period, the joint
opinion assessed the district court findings of fact as, although "troub-
ling in some respects," 54 not demonstrating that increased costs and
potential delay were unduly burdensome.5 5  This conclusion was
reached despite the fact that these burdens were placed on "those wo-
men who have the fewest financial resources, those who must travel
long distances, and those who have difficulty explaining their wherea-
bouts to husbands, employers, or others. '56 Once again, the joint
opinion's review of the district court record demonstrated how central
48. Id This ruling was based on the traditional rule of deferring to the lower court's
interpretation of state law in the absence of plain error. Id. (citing Palmer v. Hoffman, 318
U.S. 109, 118 (1943)).
49. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (1990). This provision requires that at least 24
hours prior to an abortion procedure a physician must inform the woman of the nature of
the procedure, the health risks involved in both abortion and childbirth, and an estimate of
the gestational age of the fetus. Id. Additionally, an abortion provider must inform the
woman that Pennsylvania has available to her printed materials which describe the fetus,
outline medical assistance available for childbirth, provide information about the father's
child support obligations, and list adoption agencies. Md Before receiving an abortion, the
woman must sign a written consent form certifying that she has been informed of these
printed materials, and if she requests to review them, that she has received them. Id. The
provision does provide an exception if, in the medical judgment of the abortion provider, it
appears that furnishing this information would result in a severely adverse effect on the
physical or mental health of the woman. Id.
50. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-85.
51. Ie at 885-87.
52. Id. at 884-85; see also id. at 881.
53. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
54. Id. at 886.
55. Id. at 887.
56. Id. at 886.
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this examination is to an undue burden analysis when determining the
effect of a provision.
In upholding the Pennsylvania parental consent provision, 7 the
Casey joint opinion found the provision constitutional under well-es-
tablished precedents: "We have been over most of this ground before.
Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may require a
minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guard-
ian, provided that there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure."58
Similarly, in upholding the recordkeeping and reporting require-
ments, 9 the joint opinion relied on precedent.6 0 Justice O'Connor
concluded that these recordkeeping and reporting provisions did not
impose a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice: "At most they
might increase the cost of some abortions by a slight amount. While
at some point increased cost could become a substantial obstacle,
there is no such showing on the record before us."'" Again, in its
analysis of the informed consent provision,62 the joint opinion demon-
strated that the district court findings of fact are needed to establish a
substantial obstacle under the undue burden standard unless, as in the
case of the parental consent provision, a well-established line of cases
exists.63
57. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206 (1990) (proscribing an unemancipated woman
under 18 from obtaining an abortion unless she and one of her parents or guardians pro-
vide informed consent).
58. Casey, 505 U.S. at 899 (citing Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502,
510-19 (1990) [hereinafter Akron I]], Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 461 (1990),
Akron 1, 462 U.S. 416, 440 (1983), and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979)).
59. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3207 (1990) (requiring every facility performing abor-
tions to file a report stating its name and address, and that of any related, controlling, or
subsidiary organization); id. § 3214 (requiring every facility to file a report for each abor-
tion identifying the doctor, the facility, the referring doctor, the woman's age, her marital
status, the number of her prior pregnancies and prior abortions, gestational age, type of
procedure, date, preexisting conditions, medical complications, weight of the aborted fetus,
and to file quarterly reports showing the number of abortions performed by trimester).
60. Casey, 505 U.S. at 900 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80
(1976)).
61. 1& at 901. The joint opinion did find that the provision requiring an abortion
provider to document and report that a married woman seeking an abortion had notified
her husband was an undue burden for the same reasons that the spousal notification provi-
sion was struck down. KL; see infra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
63. The Casey joint opinion apparently clarifies only those areas of abortion law that
are in a state of confusion following Webster. This can be seen in its explanation and par-
tial overruling of the informed consent cases, and its simple citation to well-settled law with
regard to parental consent. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884-85 (informed consent), 899 (paren-
tal consent).
b. The Spousal Notification Provision
In striking down the Pennsylvania spousal notification provision,
the Casey joint opinion found it to be an undue burden because "in a
large fraction of the cases in which [the provision] is relevant, it will
operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's choice to undergo an
abortion." 64 In making this determination, the joint opinion relied
upon the district court's findings of fact developed from the testimony
of numerous expert witnesses on the potential for physical abuse, bat-
tering, sexual assault, psychological pressure, and economic coercion
that may result from spousal notification. 65 The joint opinion supple-
mented these district court findings with other social science studies of
domestic violence.66 In particular, the Court cited one research study
that found "[w]here the husband is the father, the primary reason wo-
men do not notify their husbands is that [they] are experiencing mari-
tal difficulties, often accompanied by incidents of violence." 67 Taking
together the district court findings of fact, the independent social sci-
ence research cited, and "common sense,, 68 the joint opinion con-
cluded that "the spousal notification requirement is thus likely to
prevent a significant number of women from obtaining an abortion. "69
The joint opinion specifically rejected Pennsylvania's argument
that the spousal notification provision was valid since it imposed al-
most no burden on the vast majority of women seeking abortions and
would adversely affect fewer than one percent of women that obtain
abortions.70 In response, Justice O'Connor explained:
64. Id. at 895 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 888-91. The district court findings of fact were developed from the testimony
of medical directors of facilities that provide abortion services, doctors who have per-
formed abortions, abortion counselors, professors of medicine, and one social psychologist.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1329-34 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
66. Casey, 505 U.S. at 891-92 (citing COUNCIL ON SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS, AMERICAN
MED. Ass'N, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 7 (1991), Nancy M. Shields & Christine R. Han-
neke, Battered Wives' Reactions to Marital Rape, in THE DARK SIDE OF FAMILIES: CUR-
RENT FAMILY VIOLENCE RESEARCH 131, 144 (David Finkelhor et al. eds., 1983), LENORE
E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 27-28 (1984), Tracey B. Herbert et al.,
Coping with an Abusive Relationship: How and Why Do Women Stay?, 53 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 311 (1991), B.E. Aguirre, Why Do They Return? Abused Wives in Shelters, 30 Soc.
WORK 350, 352 (1985), and James A. Mercy & Linda E. Saltzman, Fatal Violence Among
Spouses in the United States, 1976-85, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEAmT 595 (1989)).
67. Id. at 892 (citing Barbara Ryan & Eric Plutzer, When Married Women Have Abor-
tions: Spousal Notification and Marital Interaction, 51 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 41, 44 (1989)).
The joint opinion did note, however, that only limited research has been conducted with
respect to spousal notification, and that this research involves samples too small to be
representative. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id, at 893 (emphasis added).
70. Id at 894.
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The analysis does not end with the one percent of women upon
whom the statute operates; it begins there. Legislation is mea-
sured for consistency with the Constitution by its impact on
those whose conduct it affects.... The proper focus of constitu-
tional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not
the group for whom the law is irrelevant.7
In flushing out this distinction, Justice O'Connor stated that an
undue burden analysis of the Pennsylvania spousal notification provi-
sion required scrutiny of the narrow but relevant class of women that
was the "real target" of regulation: married women seeking abortions
who do not want to notify their husbands and are not covered by a
statutory exception. 72  Through its analysis of the Pennsylvania
spousal notification provision, the Casey joint opinion establishes by
example73 that an undue burden analysis should include reliance upon
findings of fact developed from a record of extensive expert testi-
mony, which may be supplemented by social science research and
common sense, and an empirical inquiry focusing on the relevant class
of women specifically targeted by the state regulation.
c. A Summary of Casey's Use of the Undue Burden Standard
In evaluating the five Pennsylvania provisions, the joint opinion
demonstrated the application of the Casey undue burden standard to
a variety of state abortion laws. Most importantly, it illustrated why
the analysis needed to address constitutionality under either the pur-
pose or effect prong of the standard in finding whether "a state regula-
tion has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the
path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. '74
One commentator has summarized the undue burden standard as
requiring "a threshold inquiry as to both means and ends into the
state's purpose in adopting a challenged law, and then, depending on
the nature of the state's purpose, an evaluation of the impact of the
law to see if it constitutes an 'undue burden.' 7 5 The specific require-
ments of the Casey purpose and effect prongs, however, were not ex-
plicitly stated and must be derived from the analysis used by the joint
opinion in evaluating the five Pennsylvania provisions.
71. Id.
72. Itd at 895. One statutory exception available under this invalidated spousal notifi-
cation provision would have been for a medical emergency endangering the life or health
of the pregnant woman. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3203 (1990).
73. See Brownstein, supra note 39, at 883.
74. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
75. Brownstein, supra note 39, at 892.
The Purpose Prong
Under the joint opinion's analysis, an abortion restriction's pur-
pose can be determined in one of three ways: it may be explicitly
stated in the law, determined from legislative intent, or measured for
validity against long-established precedent upheld in Casey. The joint
opinion's analysis of the Pennsylvania medical emergency definition is
a simple example of establishing purpose from legislative intent.
Specifically, it accepted the Third Circuit's finding that the legis-
lature had intended to assure that a woman's life or health would not
be threatened by compliance with its abortion laws and concluded
that its purpose was therefore not unduly burdensome.76 It noted,
however, that if the legislature had intended to foreclose abortions in
the face of significant health risks, that purpose would be invalid
under an essential holding of Roe as upheld in Casey.77 In evaluating
both the parental consent and recordkeeping provisions, the joint
opinion relied entirely upon well-established precedent to find valid
purposes.78
The Effect Prong
As derived from the joint opinion's review of the Pennsylvania
provisions, the primary requirement of a Casey effect-prong analysis is
that it be based upon findings of fact. This is best illustrated by the
extensive expert testimony relied upon by the joint opinion in its as-
sessment of the spousal notification provision.79 The joint opinion
also used the district court's findings in its review of the twenty-four
hour waiting period,80 and noted the lack of factual evidence on the
record when upholding the informed consent provision8' and record-
keeping requirements. 8
From the joint opinion's analysis of the spousal notification provi-
sion, it is evident that these findings of fact must center upon the rele-
vant class of women: the group for which the law is a restriction on the
exercise of the abortion right.8 3 Facts developed to focus upon the
vast majority of women seeking abortions are insufficient to deter-
mine the facial validity of abortion restrictions.84 The joint opinion,
therefore, relied upon findings specifically developed to address the
76. 505 U.S. at 879-80.
77. Id
78. Id. at 899-900; see supra notes 57 and 63.
79. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
80. Casey, 505 U.S. at 886; see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
81. 505 U.S. at 884-85.
82. Id. at 901.
83. I at 894.
84. Id.
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battering and violence suffered by women in abusive spousal relation-
ships, and related these findings to that class of married women seek-
ing abortions which do not want to notify their husbands.85 The joint
opinion stated that this relevant class might be as small as one percent
of all women.86
The next step under the Casey effect prong would be to deter-
mine whether the impact of the law places a substantial obstacle in the
path of women seeking abortions of nonviable fetuses. The joint opin-
ion's spousal notification analysis defined "substantial obstacle" two
ways: a hinderance present in "a large fraction of cases,' 87 or a condi-
tion affecting "a significant number of women" within the relevant
class. 88
d. Later Guidance Offered by Joint Opinion Members
Since Casey, two members of the joint opinion have had occasion
to clarify the meaning of the undue burden standard. First, in April
1993, Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Souter, concurred in a
Supreme Court denial of an injunction8 9 requested by challengers of
the North Dakota Abortion Control Act.90 In this unusual concur-
rence, Justice O'Connor took the opportunity to comment on the dis-
trict court's analysis of the facial constitutionality of the North Dakota
abortion provisions:
I write separately... to point out that our denial of relief should
not be viewed as signaling agreement with the lower courts' rea-
soning. In my view, the approach taken by the lower courts is
inconsistent with Casey. In striking down Pennsylvania's
spousal-notice provision, we did not require petitioners to show
that the provision would be invalid in all circumstances.... And
the joint opinion specifically examined the record developed in
the District Court in determining that Pennsylvania's informed-
consent provision did not create an undue burden.... I believe
the lower courts should have undertaken the same analysis.91
This concurrence, written by two of the Casey joint opinion Justices,
again emphasizes the importance of engaging in an empirical inquiry
that relies upon a record of district court findings of fact.
The second opportunity for a Casey joint opinion member to clar-
ify the meaning of the undue burden standard came in February 1994
85. Id. at 895.
86. Id. at 894.
87. Id. at 895.
88. Id. at 893.
89. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993); see infra notes 204-
209 and accompanying text.
90. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1 (1991).
91. Schafer, 507 U.S. at 1014.
during a later proceeding in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.92 Once
again at the circuit court level, the Casey plaintiffs requested the
Supreme Court to stay a mandate requiring the enforcement of the
upheld Pennsylvania provisions pending their filing of a second peti-
tion for certiorari.93 Justice Souter, writing in his capacity as Circuit
Justice of the Third Circuit, issued an in-chambers opinion denying
the request for stay.94 In this opinion, Justice Souter elaborated on
the joint opinion's requirement that an undue burden analysis be
based on a factual record: "More than once, we phrased our conclu-
sion that particular provisions withstood facial challenge under the
Due Process Clause in terms of 'the record' before us in the case."95
He further explained:
[T]he references to "this record," combined with our readiness
to decide the validity of the challenged provisions under the
"undue burden" standard are plausibly understood as reflecting
two conclusions: (1) that litigants are free to challenge similar
restrictions in other jurisdictions, as well as these very provisions
as applied .... and (2) that applicants had been given a fair
opportunity to develop the record in the District Court.96
Justice Souter's discussion in this rare in-chambers opinion again
substantiates the argument that an undue burden inquiry requires an
examination of a factual record developed by the district court. Addi-
tionally, he echoed Justice O'Connor's Fargo concurrence that the fa-
cial validity of substantially similar abortion restrictions may be
challenged on a state-by-state basis by presenting factual evidence.97
Essentially, this means that two very similar abortion regulations en-
acted in different states each require an independent factual assess-
ment by each district court, and that the analysis of the
92. In Casey, the joint opinion remands the case "for proceedings consistent with this
opinion, including consideration of the question of severability." 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
On remand, the Third Circuit determined that the unconstitutional spousal notification and
corresponding recordkeeping provisions were severable from the remainder of the Penn-
sylvania abortion provisions, and then remanded the case to the district court "for such
further proceedings as may be appropriate." Casey, 978 F.2d 74, 78 (3d Cir. 1992). The
district court granted the challengers' motion to reopen the record and continue the stay.
Casey, 822 F. Supp. 227,238 (E.D. Pa. 1993). This decision was appealed by Pennsylvania,
and the Third Circuit reversed the district court's order and remanded with instructions to
enter the final judgment. Casey, 14 F.3d 848, 863 (3d Cir. 1994). The plaintiffs then ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court to stay the Third Circuit mandate, and Justice Souter in his
in-chambers opinion denied the plaintiffs' request. Casey, 114 S. Ct. 909, 912 (1994).
93. Casey, 114 S. Ct. 909 (1994) (denying plaintiffs' application for a stay of the Third
Circuit mandate pending their filing a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 911 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 887, 901).
96. 1&. (citation omitted).
97. See Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in denial of stay).
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constitutionality of the provisions of one state is not conclusive of the
constitutionality of the provisions of another state. In other words,
"Mississippi ain't Pennsylvania." 98
H. Scholarly Predictions Concerning the Application of the
Undue Burden Standard
A. Anticipated Problems Ensuing From Lack of Guidance
One of the explicit concerns of the Casey joint opinion was that
"decisions after Roe [had] cast doubt upon the meaning and reach of
its holding,"99 and therefore, lower courts "must have guidance as
they seek to address this subject."100 As one of the first courts to re-
view abortion regulations under the new Casey undue burden stan-
dard found, however, "[d]espite the recent efforts of a three-justice
plurality of the Supreme Court, passing on the constitutionality of
state statutes regulating abortion after Casey has become neither less
difficult nor more closely anchored to the Constitution."'' The ex-
plicit intention to provide clarity is particularly ironic given the
amount of scholarly comment detailing inherent defects in the undue
burden standard and predicting its troublesome application.
1. Prediction: Lack of Methodology Will Make the
Standard Unworkable
A few commentators predicted that lower court implementation
of the undue burden standard would reveal its inherent flaws since the
Casey joint opinion failed to establish clearly a practical procedure for
the test. For example, the joint opinion provided no methodology for
identifying an invalid state purpose that would create an undue bur-
den or for determining whether a regulation created an undue burden
through its effect.'02 Critics also argued that the joint opinion failed to
explain how the effects of a state regulation should be calculated, how
much of an effect would be necessary for finding an undue burden, or
what types of effects are even relevant to the inquiry. 0 3 Similarly,
98. Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12, 15 n.5 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
1021 (1992).
99. Casey, 505 U.S. at 845.
100. Id. Following this declaration, Justice O'Connor reviewed "the principles that de-
fine the rights of the woman and the legitimate authority of the State respecting the termi-
nation of pregnancies by abortion procedures," a discussion which led to the reaffirmation
of the essential holding of Roe. Id. at 845-46.
101. Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1337 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 468
(1993).
102. Gillian E. Metzger, Note, Unburdening the Undue Burden Standard. Orienting
Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2025, 2035 (1994); see Brown-
stein, supra note 39, at 881-92 (discussing purpose and effect prongs of Casey).
103. Metzger, supra note 102, at 2035; Howard, supra note 40, at 1488.
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another commentator stated that no guidance was given on how much
weight to give each abortion restriction when balancing it against a
woman's right to choose. 10 4 Moreover, these deficiencies in method-
ology cannot be rectified by reference to earlier enunciations of the
undue burden standard since the Casey version is different from any
previously articulated. 10 5
2. Prediction: The Inconsistent Methods Used in Casey Will Confuse
the Lower Courts
This lack of methodology, some have argued, will be worsened by
inconsistencies in the Casey joint opinion itself.'06 For example,
although it calls for a factual inquiry and engages in such an inquiry
when determining the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania spousal
notification provision, the joint opinion does not examine the factual
record in sustaining the informed consent requirement 0 7 It also was
predicted that, due to these inconsistencies, lower courts might forego
the requisite factual analysis of an abortion regulation and instead ap-
ply the specific holdings of Casey.08 In other words, if a court was
reviewing a regulation substantially similar to one which Casey had
upheld, there might be a tendency to uphold the provision because of
its similarity to the Casey provision instead of engaging in an in-
dependent factual analysis.
3. Prediction: Abortion Litigation Will Increase
Commentators predicted the ambiguity of the undue burden test
would cause an increase in abortion law challenges seeking to clarify
the boundaries of this new standard. 09 Further, it was argued that the
104. Janet Benshoof, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Impact of the New Undue Bur-
den Standard on Reproductive Health Care, 269 L. & MED. 2249, 2252 (1993).
105. Metzger, supra note 102, at 2036. The first test by this name appeared in Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Akron 1, 462 U.S. 416,468 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Later,
it surfaced again in a more delineated form in her dissent in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing), in which she contended that "[a]n undue burden will generally be found 'in situations
involving absolute obstacles or severe limitations on the abortion decision,' not wherever a
state regulation 'may "inhibit" abortions to some degree."' Id. (quoting Akron 1, 462 U.S.
at 464). This Thornburgh version displays a midpoint in Justice O'Connor's development
of the undue burden standard, incorporating language from the Akron I version, but not
yet setting out the purpose and effect prongs that emerge in Casey.
106. See Howard, supra note 40, at 1483-88 (discussing internal flaws in the Casey deci-
sion that will likely lead to a confused and inconsistent standard).
107. Id. at 1484-85; see supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
108. Metzger, supra note 102, at 2037-38.
109. Alan I. Bigel, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey: Consti-
tutional Principles and Political Turbulence, 18 U. DAYTON L. REv. 733,762 (1993); Natalie
Wright, Note, State Abortion Law After Casey: Finding "Adequate and Independent"
Grounds for Choice in Ohio, 54 Omo ST. L.J. 891, 899 (1993).
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standard is unworkable because without giving the lower courts gui-
dance, the Supreme Court "will be called upon to rule on every little
variant the states will dream up to assert their regulatory privilege"110
and become embroiled in "the minutiae of state legislation regarding
the reasonableness of wisdom of statutory measures." '' Ultimately,
commentators have predicted that the post-Casey litigation would re-
sult in a reformulation of constitutional standards. 1  "[lBefore there
is a final word on the contours of the 'undue burden' standard," a few
years of litigation may be necessary." 3
B. Anticipated Problems Resulting From Judicial Discretion
Several commentators have agreed that the Casey joint opinion,
by not providing more specific guidance for the lower courts in apply-
ing the undue burden standard, in effect has handed lower court
judges a significant amount of discretion. Commentators predicted
this broad discretion, coupled with the lack of specified methodology,
would lead to speculative, biased, arbitrary, and inconsistent
outcomes.
1. Prediction: Judicial Bias and Speculation Will Result
Justice Scalia predicted that the imprecision of the undue burden
standard would compel the lower courts to assess abortion regulations
according to the subjective notions of each judge, and thus found the
standard "inherently manipulable.""' Some believed that the stan-
dard would allow district courts to arbitrarily choose which factors to
consider in reviewing a state abortion regulation," 5 and that individ-
ual trial judges would receive "virtually unfettered discretion to up-
hold new anti-choice legislation.""' 6 Commentators argued that
judges would rely on their limited life experience to decide whether a
regulation unconstitutionally interferes with a woman's right to
choose or obtain an abortion. 117 A judge who personally held anti-
abortion sentiments, therefore, could become "a rubber stamp" for
state abortion regulations."'
110. Charles S. Ross, The Right of Privacy and Restraints on Abortion Under the "Un-
due Burden" Test" A Jurisprudential Comparison of Planned Parenthood v. Casey with
European Practice and Italian Law, 3 IND. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 199, 201 (1993).
111. Bigel, supra note 109, at 759.
112. Id. at 762.
113. Kolbert & Gans, supra note 37, at 1156.
114. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 985-86 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
115. Schneider, supra note 39, at 1033; Benshoof, supra note 104, at 2252.
116. Julie Schrager, The Impact of Casey, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1331, 1331-32 (1992).
117. Schneider, supra note 39, at 1027.
118. Id
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2. Prediction: Inconsistent and Arbitrary Outcomes Will Occur
One scholar predicted that the failure to develop a methodical
analysis, when combined with judicial discretion, would likely result in
inconsistent rulings on abortion statutes. 19 Consequently, it was
thought that different results would arise from cases with substantially
similar facts. 2 ° In turn, some believed that these inconsistencies in
outcome would lead to abortion laws that vary greatly from state to
state since what is not burdensome to women in Pennsylvania may
well be burdensome to women in other states.' 2'
Taken together, this array of criticism of the undue burden stan-
dard seems to all but foreclose the standard's workability. Further,
the inherently factual nature of the standard will engage the lower
courts in a more complex analysis than previously required under
Roe's brightline trimester framework. As one commentator aptly de-
scribed it, the undue burden standard is "'a principle' as much as a
test," and will undergo refinement every time it is applied.' 22
i. A Survey and Analysis of the Casey Undue Burden
Standard as Used by the Lower Courts in State
Abortion Law Challenges
Since the Casey decision in June 1992, the lower courts have ap-
plied the undue burden standard in thirteen cases challenging the fa-
cial constitutionality of state abortion regulations. 23 These cases
119. Metzger, supra note 102, at 2037.
120. Schneider, supra note 39, at 1031-32.
121. Metzger, supra note 102, at 2038 (arguing an undue burden might be found in
other states which have fewer abortion providers, or which have more rural or poor popu-
lations unable to pay transportation expenses).
122. Ross, supra note 110, at 213.
123. Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64
U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1996) (No. 95-856); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th
Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Feb. 5, 1996) (No. 95-1242); Fargo
Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993), denying application for stay and
injunction pending appeal from 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994); Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d
1335 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 114 S. Ct. 468 (1993); Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27
(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993); Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992); Armstrong v. Mazurek, No. CV-95-083-
GF, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20136, at *8-*9 (D. Mont. Sept. 29, 1995); Women's Medical
Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Ohio 1995); A Woman's Choice-
East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434 (S.D. Ind. 1995); Causeway Medi-
cal Suite v. Ieyoub, 905 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. La. 1995); Utah Women's Clinic v. Leavitt, 844
F. Supp. 1482 (D. Utah 1994); Planned Parenthood v. Neely, 804 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Ariz.
1992); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
So far, no challenge based on the Casey undue burden standard has arisen in an "as
applied" context. However, such a challenge is available to test the constitutionality of
abortion restrictions after implementation. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 114 S. Ct. 909,
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involved restrictive abortion regulations imposed by Mississippi,124
Louisiana," Arizona,'126 Utah,'127 North Dakota,1' South Dakota,129
Pennsylvania, 3 ° Ohio,131 and Indiana. 32 In eight of these cases, the
courts determined the disposition of state abortion statutes which
were enacted prior to Casey.'3 3 In five more recent cases, the courts
911 (1994) ("litigants are free to challenge ... these very provisions as applied"); Casey, 14
F.3d 848, 861-62 ("[W]e believe the Court meant that a future 'as applied' challenge to the
Pennsylvania Act would be possible, and plaintiffs could demonstrate in practice that the
Act imposed an undue burden."), 862 n.18 ("[A]n 'as applied' challenge is always possible
after implementation.") (1994); see generally Gary Knapp, Annotation, Supreme Court's
Views as to Validity, Under Federal Constitution, of Abortion Laws, 111 L. Ed. 2d 879
(1993) (discussing practical considerations in bringing an "as applied" challenge to an abor-
tion law).
Only one state court action has so far challenged abortion restrictions under federal
constitutional law. See Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio Ct. App.
1993). In Preterm, an Ohio state appellate court reviewed the facial constitutionality of an
Ohio abortion regulation under the Casey undue burden standard. Id. at 577. The in-
formed consent provision reviewed by the court required that twenty-four hours before an
abortion a physician must inform the woman of the medical risks involved in the abortion
procedure, the probable gestational age of the fetus, and the medical risks associated with
pregnancy. Id. at 577-78. Undertaking no analysis except a comparison of the Ohio provi-
sion to the Pennsylvania informed consent requirement in Casey, the court was unable to
distinguish the two statutes, id. at 578, and found "no infirmity" in the legislation. Id. at
577. Therefore, the Preterm court did not engage in an undue burden analysis, but instead
upheld the Ohio regulation merely by comparing it to its counterpart upheld in Casey.
For discussions of the implications of Casey for state abortion law, see generally
Kolbert & Gans, supra note 37, and Wright, supra note 109.
Often state constitutions provide greater protection of a woman's privacy interests.
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Shasta-Diablo v. Williams, 873 P.2d 1224 (Cal. 1994); Wo-
men's Health Ctr. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658 (W. Va. 1994). But see Preterm Cleveland,
627 N.E.2d at 584 ("[W]e find no reason under the circumstances of this case to find that
the Ohio Constitution confers upon a pregnant woman a greater right to choose whether to
have an abortion or bear the child than is conferred by the United States Constitution.").
124. Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 468 (1993);
Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992).
125. Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972
(1993); Causeway Medical Suite v. Ieyoub, 905 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. La. 1995).
126. Planned Parenthood v. Neely, 804 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Ariz. 1992).
127. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995), petition for cert filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Feb. 5, 1996) (No. 95-1242); Utah Women's Clinic v. Leavitt, 844 F.
Supp. 1482 (D. Utah 1994).
128. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993), denying application
for stay and injunction pending appeal from 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994).
129. Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64
U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1996) (No. 95-856).
130. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 14 F.3d 848, 863 (3d Cir. 1994).
131. Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Ohio
1995); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
132. A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434 (S.D.
Ind. 1995).
133. Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 468 (1993);
Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992);
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have ruled on state abortion statutes that were enacted after the Casey
decision.134 Application of the undue burden standard has now been
reviewed by the Third,3 5 Fifth,1 36 Eighth, 37 and Tenth3 8 Circuits.
A. The Fifth Circuit Cases
The Fifth Circuit was the first Court of Appeals to review the
constitutionality of a state abortion law under the Casey undue bur-
den standard. In the Mississippi and Louisiana cases, the Fifth Circuit
applied the undue burden standard while reviewing three pre-Casey
district court decisions ruling on the facial constitutionality of various
state abortion regulations. 39 Two of these cases involved abortion
laws enacted during the post-Webster abortion climate, 4 ° while the
third case concerned the constitutionality of a 1986 pre-Webster abor-
tion statute that had been stayed for four years awaiting several Mis-
sissippi Supreme Court rulings on abortion.' 4 ' In its review of these
three facial challenges, the Fifth Circuit found only the Louisiana stat-
ute to be an undue burden. 42
Planned Parenthood v. Neely, 804 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Ariz. 1992); Sojourner T. v. Edwards,
974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d
1493 (10th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Feb. 5, 1996) (No. 95-
1242); Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993), denying application
for stay and injunction pending appeal from 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 14 F.3d 848, 863 (3d Cir. 1994); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627
N.E.2d 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
134. See, eg., Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
64 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1996) (No. 95-856); Women's Medical Professional Corp.
v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Causeway Medical Suite v. Ieyoub, 905
F. Supp. 360 (E.D. La. 1995); A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman,
904 F. Supp. 1434 (S.D. Ind. 1995); Utah Women's Clinic v. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482 (D.
Utah 1994).
135. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 14 F.3d 848, 863 (3d Cir. 1994).
136. Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 468 (1993);
Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992);
Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993).
137. Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64
U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1996) (No. 95-856); Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer,
507 U.S. 1013 (1993), denying application for stay and injunction pending appeal from 18
F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994).
138. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Feb. 5, 1996) (No. 95-1242).
139. Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 468 (1993);
Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993);
Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992).
140. Sojourner T., 974 F.2d at 29 (noting the Louisiana legislature enacted the Louisi-
ana Abortion Statute in June of 1991); Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d at 13 (noting the Missis-
sippi legislature enacted the Informed Consent to Abortion Act in March 1991).
141. Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d at 1337 (discussing Miss. CoDE ANN. §§ 41-41-51 to
-63 (1986)).
142. Sojourner T., 974 F.2d at 31.
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1. Barnes v. Moore
In August 1992, less than two months after the Casey decision,
the Fifth Circuit decided the first case applying the new undue burden
standard. In Barnes v. Moore,'1 3 the plaintiffs challenged the facial
constitutionality of the Mississippi Informed Consent to Abortion
Act," which required a physician to inform a patient of the medical
risks of abortion and provide her with information prepared by the
state on abortion and its alternatives prior to performing an abortion
procedure. 14 5 The Mississippi statute also required that a twenty-four
hour waiting period lapse between the time the physician provided the
patient with the information and the performance of the abortion. 46
While an appeal of the district court's injunction suspending enforce-
ment of the statute was pending in Moore, the United States Supreme
Court rendered its decision in Casey, upholding substantially identical
Pennsylvania provisions. 47
In their supplemental briefs, the plaintiffs raised a host of argu-
ments in an attempt to distinguish the Mississippi abortion provisions
from the Pennsylvania provisions of Casey.'" Principally, they argued
that, under Casey, the case should be remanded for evidentiary pro-
ceedings so that they might prove that the Mississippi statute posed an
undue burden on women seeking abortions, regardless of the relative
similarities to the Pennsylvania provisions upheld in Casey. 4 9 They
reduced this argument to the aphorism "Mississippi ain't
Pennsylvania."'
Although the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Casey applied a
different standard in striking down the Pennsylvania spousal notifica-
tion provision,' 5' it invoked the traditional formula for testing the fa-
cial validity of a statute as specified in United States v. Salerno.52 This
test requires a plaintiff to prove facial invalidity by establishing that
"no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid."'53 In choosing to apply the Salerno test rather than engage in
the factual inquiry required under Casey, the Fifth Circuit cited Chief
143. 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992).
144. Miss. CODE AN. §§ 41-41-39, 41-41-59 to -63 (1993).
145. Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d at 14.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 13.
148. See id. at 14.
149. See id. at 15.
150. See id. at 15 n.5.
151. Id. at 14 n.2.
152. 481 U.S. 739 (1987); see infra notes 337-342 and accompanying text.
153. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
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Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Casey,'54 stating that it did not interpret
Casey as having overruled the Salerno test in the abortion context.155
The Fifth Circuit went on to find that "[i]n light of Casey's holding
substantially identical provisions of the Pennsylvania Act facially con-
stitutional, the plaintiffs cannot satisfy this 'heavy burden."1 56
With regard to plaintiffs' argument that the matter should be re-
manded for evidentiary hearings and findings of fact, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that the Casey joint opinion extensively referred to the
district court findings of fact during its analysis of the Pennsylvania
provisions. 57 Yet, the Fifth Circuit concluded that "the differences
between the Mississippi and Pennsylvania Acts are not sufficient to
render the former unconstitutional on its face," and that "[f]urther
evidentiary proceedings would not affect that conclusion."' 5 8
The Fifth Circuit, in the first case to review the constitutionality
of a state abortion law under the Casey standard, avoided applying the
undue burden standard. Instead, it fell back upon the Salerno test for
facial constitutionality, which makes almost any conceivable abortion
regulation facially constitutional because of the extremely heavy bur-
den of proof it places upon challengers. The Fifth Circuit also refused
to remand for the factfnding required by Casey.
Barnes v. Moore exhibits many of the problems predicted by
commentators. By not making explicit how the lower courts should
handle the conflicting Salerno precedent, the Casey joint opinion did
indeed leave room for confusion at the lower court level. Because of
this lack of guidance, the Fifth Circuit, given its apparent uncertainty,
improperly cited a Casey dissenting opinion as authority for its deci-
sion to apply Salerno instead of the undue burden standard. Further,
Barnes v. Moore is an example of a lower court declining to conduct
the factual analysis required by the Casey joint opinion, and instead
applying the specific holdings of Casey to avoid the uncertainties of
implementing a new constitutional standard with no clear model for
application.
154. Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d at 14 n.2. In Casey, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote "be-
cause this is a facial challenge to the Act, it is insufficient for petitioners to show that the
notification provision 'might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of cir-
cumstances."' 505 U.S. 833, 972 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part> (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745). Instead, "they must 'show that no set of cir-
cumstances exists under which the [provision] would be valid."' Id. (quoting Akron 11, 497
U.S. 502,514 (1990)). The Chief Justice further stated that "[t]he joint opinion ... appears
to ignore this point in concluding that the spousal notice provision imposes an undue bur-
den on the abortion decision." I& at 973 n.2.
155. Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d at 14 n.2.
156. Im at 14.
157. Id at 15.
158. Id
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2. Sojourner T. v. Edwards
In September 1992, one month after its opinion in Barnes v.
Moore, the Fifth Circuit decided a second case involving the Casey
undue burden standard. In Sojourner T. v. Edwards,'59 plaintiffs
brought a pre-Casey160 facial challenge to the 1991 Louisiana abortion
statute 61 criminalizing the performance of all abortions except when
the pregnancy was terminated under the following circumstances: to
save the life or health of the unborn child, to remove a dead unborn
child, to save the life of the mother, or because the pregnancy was the
result of rape or incest. 62 The rape and incest exceptions to the Loui-
siana statute also required that the abortion be performed within the
first thirteen weeks of pregnancy. 63 The district court found the stat-
ute unconstitutional under Roe.16 While the suit was on appeal to the
Fifth Circuit, the United States Supreme Court decided Casey.
Citing Casey's reaffirmation of the essential holding of Roe, that
before viability the state's interests are not strong enough to support a
prohibition of abortion, 165 the Fifth Circuit struck down the Louisiana
abortion regulation as plainly unconstitutional because it imposed an
undue burden on women seeking an abortion before viability. 66
Since the statute amounted to a prohibition on almost all abortions
during the previability stage, which violated an essential holding of
Roe, the Fifth Circuit found the law's explicit purpose to be invalid
under Casey. The Sojourner T. opinion, therefore, illustrates the sim-
plest type of inquiry under the purpose prong of the undue burden
standard since it involved an explicitly unconstitutional purpose. To
find an undue burden under these circumstances, the court needed to
determine only that the abortion regulation in its language was explic-
itly contrary to an essential holding of Roe.
3. Barnes v. Mississippi
In May 1993, eight months after its opinion in Sojourner T. v.
Edwards, the Fifth Circuit decided a third case involving the Casey
159. 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993).
160. Plaintiffs originally argued that the statute was unconstitutional under Roe V.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and also void
for vagueness. Sojourner T., 974 F.2d at 28. Louisiana contended that the law was consti-
tutional because Roe had been overruled sub silentio by Webster. Id.
161. 1991 La. Acts 26 (amending and re-enacting LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:87 (West
1990)).
162. Sojourner T., 974 F.2d at 29. The rape and incest exceptions imposed certain addi-
tional reporting requirements. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 28.
165. Id. at 30 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)).
166. Id. at 31.
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undue burden standard. In Barnes v. Mississippi,167 the plaintiffs
launched a facial challenge to the 1986 Mississippi abortion statute 68
requiring a minor obtain the consent of both parents before having an
abortion. 169 In a pre-Casey decision, the district court had previously
held the statute unconstitutional, and the state appealed.' 0 On ap-
peal, the challengers argued that the two-parent requirement served
no important state interest, unduly restricted a minor's access to an
abortion, and intruded on a family's right to structure its
relationships.' 7'
In its review, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the inquiry under
Casey as turning on "an examination of the importance of the state's
interest in the regulation and the severity of the burden that regula-
tion imposes on the woman's right to seek an abortion."' 72 In the first
prong of its inquiry, the Fifth Circuit determined that Mississippi did
have an important interest in protecting children from their own im-
maturity and naivete, as well as from the possibly deficient advice of
abortion providers. 173 It found these state interests equally present if
not "heightened" with a two-parent consent provision because of the
increased benefit of having both parents involved.' 74
In addressing the second prong of the inquiry, the Fifth Circuit
stated that although a two-parent consent requirement would gener-
ally increase the number of children utilizing the judicial bypass mech-
anism, "the bulk of the burden is in requiring the consent of even one
parent, as the state is unquestionably entitled to do."'175 The court
therefore held that the additional burden placed upon the minor by
requiring the approval of the second parent would be slight,176 and did
not place an undue burden upon a minor's right to seek an
abortion. 177
The Fifth Circuit's analysis in Barnes v. Mississippi is generally in
line with the Casey joint opinion in that the joint opinion did not en-
gage in an undue burden analysis with regard to Pennsylvania's one-
parent consent with judicial bypass provision. 7 8 Instead, the joint
167. 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 468 (1993).
168. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-51 to -63 (1993).
169. Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d at 1337. This parental consent provision contains a
typical judicial bypass mechanism. See Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-53(3) (1993).
170. Id, at 1336-37.
171. Id, at 1337-38.
172. Id. at 1339.
173. Id,
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1340.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 1341.
178. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992).
Spring 19961
850 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:825
opinion upheld the provision based on well-established precedent: 79
"Our cases establish, and we reaffirm today, that a State may require a
minor seeking an abortion to obtain the consent of a parent or guard-
ian, provided that there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure."' 8 0
Following the example of Casey, the Fifth Circuit for the most part
properly engaged in a relatively simple inquiry due to the close body
of applicable constitutional law. 81 Its examination of Mississippi's
two-parent consent provision, however, did not require a full undue
burden analysis based on factual findings such as that illustrated by
the Casey joint opinion's treatment of Pennsylvania's spousal notifica-
tion provision.lar Instead, under a purpose prong inquiry, the statute
was found to have a clearly invalid purpose under well-established law
upheld in Casey.
In its failure to engage in the factfinding required by the undue
burden standard, however, the Fifth Circuit came close to fulfilling the
prediction that the undue burden standard would allow judges to as-
sess abortion regulations according to their own subjective notions. In
its holding that only a slight burden will be placed upon the minor by
requiring her to obtain approval of a second parent, the Fifth Circuit's
conclusion rests in large part upon ungrounded assumptions. Within
its discussion of this issue, the Fifth Circuit included the following un-
supported notions:8 3 "involvement of both parents in the decision-
making process might increase the reflection and deliberation on the
decisions"; 18 "[w]here the state supplies an expeditious process for
obtaining court approval, the additional burden on the minor is
greatly relieved"'; 5 and "where one parent withholds consent, the mi-
nor will often have a willing supportive parent to accompany her to
179. Id. at 899.
180. Id (citing Akron II, 497 U.S. 502,510-19 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring), Hodg-
son v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), Akron 1, 462 U.S. 416, 440 (1983), and Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 (1979)).
181. Id at 1338-41 (citing Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), Planned
Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983), Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), and
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).
182. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
183. The court provided no legal authority or social science research for any of these
ideas, as required by Casey. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
184. Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d at 1339. Obviously, the reverse of this statement
may be the case. For example, an increase in negative parental involvement could bring a
doubling of the potential danger of a parental veto over the minor's right to seek an abor-
tion. In addition, one parent, perhaps the mother, may understand the child's concerns
better than a second parent.
185. Id at 1340. The court gave no explanation for how the judicial bypass mechanisms
will corrolatively decrease the burden upon the minor as the analysis shifts from a one-
parent to a two-parent consent requirement. Upon reflection, this statement may merely
indicate that even under the press of an additional burden the minor may still avail herself
of the bypass mechanisms.
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court."1 8 6
In ruling on the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's spousal notifi-
cation provisions, the Casey joint opinion relies upon the district court
findings of fact developed from extensive expert testimony. Similarly,
the Fifth Circuit should have remanded the case to allow parties to
present expert testimony. Of course, such a procedure does not guar-
antee that the ultimate judicial opinion will be free of all subjective
notions. It would be an improvement, however, over the method used
in Barnes v. Mississippi, in which the Fifth Circuit grounded its analy-
sis in untested assumptions.
4. A Recent District Court Case Within the Fifth Circuit: Causeway
Medical Suite v. Ieyoub
In October 1995, a Louisiana district court in Causeway Medical
Suite v. Ieyoub, s7 granted summary judgment to challengers and per-
manently enjoined two 1995 revisions 88 to the judicial bypass provi-
sions of the Louisiana parental consent law." 9
While acknowledging that under Fifth Circuit law a facial chal-
lenge to an abortion law must meet the strict Salerno test, the court
applied neither the Salerno or Casey standard, 190 since the revisions
clearly violated the rights of all minors seeking judicial bypass of a
parental consent requirement as established in Bellotti v. Baird,191 and
upheld in subsequent Supreme Court cases including Casey.9 The
leyoub court, therefore, did not perform an undue burden analysis
although it concluded that the 1995 revisions constituted an "undue
burden."' 93 The court's analysis, however, would have been identical
186. Id.
187. 905 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. La. 1995).
188. 1995 La. Acts 40:1299.35.5.
189. Ieyoub, 905 F. Supp. at 361.
190. Id. at 363 n.2.
191. Id. at 363 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)). The court found that these
statutory revisions were directly in conflict with all four Bellotti requirements for judicial
bypass. First, by substituting "may" for "shall," the amendment would give judges discre-
tion to deny an abortion to a minor although she had sufficiently shown herself to be
mature and informed. Id. at 364. Second, the amendment did not specify within what
period of time a juvenile court must rule on the minor's request, and therefore it failed to
guarantee an expeditious determination sufficient to allow an effective opportunity for the
minor to obtain an abortion as required under Bellotti. Id at 365. Third, the amendment
also failed to ensure an expeditious determination by allowing a judge to order mental
health counseling for the minor prior to making a ruling with no timeframe for its comple-
tion. Id. at 365. Fourth, the amendment improperly required that the juvenile court could
notify the parents of immature minors who applied by judicial bypass if the court deter-
mined parental involvement would be in their best interests. Id. at 365-66.
192. Id. at 365 (citing Akron II, 497 U.S. 502 (1990) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992)).
193. Id at 366.
Spring 19961
852 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23:825
under a purpose prong inquiry of the Casey undue burden standard
since the district court found that the 1995 amendment demonstrated
on its face four invalid purposes as defined previously in Bellotti.
B. The Eighth Circuit Cases
1. The Fargo Cases
a. The District Court Decision
In February 1993, a North Dakota district court decided Fargo
Women's Health Organization v. Sinner and upheld the entire North
Dakota Abortion Control Act' 94 as facially constitutional. 195 In
Fargo, the plaintiffs challenged a twenty-four hour waiting period, an
informed consent requirement, a physician penalty provision, and the
statute's definitions of abortion and medical emergency. 96 The chal-
lengers urged the court to make a factual assessment of the burden
imposed on the right to choose an abortion.197 They argued that the
fact-intensive inquiry used by the Casey joint opinion signified a new
standard of review for facial challenges. 98 The district court however
refused to engage in the requested burden assessment199 and con-
cluded, after citing Barnes v. Moore2° and Justice Scalia's dissent in
Ada v. Guam Society of Obstetricians & Gynecologists,20' that Casey
did not create a new standard of review for facial challenges.
20 2
Instead, using the Salerno test for reviewing facial challenges, and
noting the striking similarities between the North Dakota and Penn-
sylvania provisions upheld in Casey as well as their similarity to the
Mississippi provisions upheld in Barnes v. Moore, the district court
held that the challengers could not satisfy "the heavy burden required
for a successful facial challenge. '2 3 Here again, a lower court failed
to apply the undue burden standard because the Casey joint opinion
was not explicit in its overruling of Salerno in the context of facial
challenges to abortion restrictions. This lack of guidance allowed the
lower court to sidestep a factual inquiry. Because of its confusion
over the methodology required under an undue burden analysis, the
district court also improperly depended upon the relative similarities
between North Dakota and Pennsylvania provisions in its ruling.
194. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1 (1991).
195. 819 F. Supp. 862, 865 (D.N.D. 1993).
196. Id. at 863.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 864 n.2.
199. Id.
200. 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992).
201. 506 U.S. 1011 (1992) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); see infra notes 346-347 and accompanying text.
202. Sinner, 819 F. Supp. at 864 n.2.
203. Id. at 864 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
b. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence in the Denial of Stay
The challengers then appealed to the Eighth Circuit and re-
quested an injunction staying enforcement of the North Dakota abor-
tion statute.20 4 The Eighth Circuit denied their request for injunctive
relief, agreeing with the district court that Salerno applied and Casey
did not require a different approach.20 5 The plaintiffs then appealed
to the Supreme Court for a stay of the district court's judgment and an
injunction staying enforcement pending appeal.20 6 Although the ap-
plication was denied, in an unusual concurrence joined by Justice Sou-
ter, Justice O'Connor explained:
I write separately.., to point out that our denial of relief should
not be viewed as signaling agreement with the lower courts' rea-
soning. In my view, the approach taken by the lower courts is
inconsistent with Casey. In striking down Pennsylvania's
spousal-notice provision, we did not require petitioners to show
that the provision would be invalid in all circumstances. Rather,
we made clear that a law restricting abortions constitutes an un-
due burden ... if, "in a large fraction of the cases in which [the
law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a wo-
man's choice to undergo an abortion."... And the joint opinion
specifically examined the record developed in the District Court
in determining that Pennsylvania's informed-consent provision
did not create an undue burden.... While I express no view as
to whether the particular provisions at issue in this case consti-
tute an undue burden, I believe the lower courts should have
undertaken the same analysis. 2 7
Even though Justice Kennedy, the third Justice of the Casey joint
opinion, did not join in the concurrence,20 it is safe to say that Justice
O'Connor legitimately represents the voice of the Casey joint opinion
were it to speak today. As such, the concurrence clarified a few of the
issues that the lower courts stumbled over in their first attempts to
apply the Casey undue burden standard. Specifically, the Fargo con-
currence explained: the use of the Salerno standard for reviewing fa-
cial challenges is inconsistent with Casey, the test for a facial challenge
to a law restricting abortions under Casey is whether it operates as a
substantial obstacle to a woman's choice in a large fraction of cases in
which the law is relevant, and this inquiry requires an examination of
the district court record.2 9
204. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994).
205. Id.
206. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013, 1013 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
207. Id. at 1014 (citations omitted).
208. Without knowing the circumstances of why Justice Kennedy did not join in this
concurrence, it would be presumptuous to draw any legal meaning from his absence.
209. 507 U.S. at 1014.
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c. The Circuit Court Opinion
In February 1994, the Eighth Circuit decided Fargo Women's
Health Organization v. Schafer.21° The challengers argued that the un-
due burden standard requires a trial court to make factual findings,
and that a facial challenge may succeed even if the statute could be
applied constitutionally to some women.211 North Dakota argued that
the district court properly dismissed the suit because its legislation was
similar to the Pennsylvania statute upheld in Casey.212 Given Justice
O'Connor's Fargo concurrence, the Eighth Circuit decided that it
should analyze the issues first under the Salerno test, and then alterna-
tively as if the undue burden standard had replaced Salerno.213
Under its Salerno analysis, the Eighth Circuit summarily accepted
the district court's finding that the challengers had failed to overcome
the difficult burden of proving that no set of circumstances existed
under which the law could be constitutionally valid.21 '4 For its undue
burden analysis, the Eighth Circuit incorporated the guidance pro-
vided by Justice O'Connor's Fargo concurrence and embarked on a
factual inquiry of whether the North Dakota law operated as a sub-
stantial obstacle to a woman's choice to obtain an abortion in a large
fraction of cases in which the law was relevant.215 As the basis for this
factual assessment, the court accepted as true the affidavits and depo-
sition testimony submitted by plaintiffs in their opposition papers.216
The plaintiffs' principal arguments against each of the North Da-
kota provisions were that they unduly burdened a woman's right to an
abortion because they would require two trips to an abortion provider
instead of one, "exposing the woman to dual harassment, stalking, and
contact at home. '21 7 For example, the North Dakota statute contains
210. 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994).
211. Id at 528.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 529. The Eighth Circuit apparently did not find Justice O'Connor's Fargo
concurrence conclusive, and decided that the proper inquiry required examination under
both approaches because "[i]f the three justices [had] wanted to depart from the Salerno
standard, we believe they would have specifically stated that the standard did not apply."
Id.
Judge McMillian dissented, stating that he believed the district court erred in applying
the Salerno test, and the proper formulation to be used was stated by Justice O'Connor in
her concurrence. Id. at 536 (McMillian, J., dissenting). "I would remand this case to the
district court with instructions that [it] hold an evidentiary hearing and make factual find-
ings as to whether the North Dakota provisions in question create such an undue burden."
Id.
214. Id. at 530 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 533. The challengers also argued that the additional visit would increase
travel and extended-stay expenses. Id.
several sections requiring an abortion provider to give certain infor-
mation to a woman seeking an abortion at least twenty-four hours
prior to an abortion procedure; the challengers argued that these re-
quirements would mandate at least one additional visit.218 The Eighth
Circuit found instead that the statute's provisions requiring a woman
be "told" or "informed" of this information did not require the face-
to-face verbal exchanges:219 "We do not believe a telephone call and a
single trip, whatever the distance to the medical facility, create an un-
due burden." 0
With the assurance that "[w]e have applied the undue burden
standard to the factual record made in the district court as the
Supreme Court did in Casey,"2 1 the Eighth Circuit found that the
North Dakota statute's twenty-four hour waiting period and informed
consent requirements, physician penalty provisions, and abortion and
medical emergency definitions posed no substantial obstacle to a wo-
man's choice to undergo an abortion and did not constitute an undue
burden.222 The court also noted the "close similarity" of the North
Dakota informed consent, twenty-four hour waiting period, and medi-
cal emergency definition provisions, to their Pennsylvania counter-
parts upheld in Casey,- 3 stating that this similarity "reaffirms our
conclusion that these particular provisions of the statute are not an
undue burden for women in North Dakota." 4
In Fargo Women's Health Organization v. Schafer, the Eighth Cir-
cuit was the first court after Casey to engage in a factual inquiry in
undertaking an undue burden analysis.2 5 This inquiry was in large
part due to the guidance delivered by Justice O'Connor in her Fargo
concurrence which made clear that a factual inquiry must be under-
taken. The Eighth Circuit, however, was less convinced by the Fargo
concurrence on the issue of whether to apply Salerno. Even though
the concurrence specified that in Casey the Court had not required
challengers "to show that the provision would be invalid in all circum-
218. Id. at 530-31.
219. Id. The Eighth Circuit accepted the North Dakota Attorney General's arguments
that the information could be given by telephone, the woman's written certification that
she received the information could be obtained when she came for the procedure, and
gestational age of the fetus could be obtained by an agent of the physician. Id. at 530.
220. Id at 533.
221. Id. at 536 n.8.
222. IM. at 530-34.
223. Id at 532-33.
224. Md. at 533.
225. The court did not, however, examine district court findings because this was an
appeal from summary judgment. Id at 530. It therefore substituted the evidence provided
by the challengers in their opposition papers. Id.
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stances," 6 the Eighth Circuit still found the applicability of Salerno
to abortion regulations to be an "open question."227
2. Planned Parenthood v. Miller
a. The District Court Case
In August 1994, a South Dakota district court decided Planned
Parenthood v. Miller, finding the civil and criminal penalty provisions
of the South Dakota abortion statute'2 s to be unduly burdensome on
women seeking abortions.229 The court, however, upheld an informed
consent requirement, a twenty-four hour waiting period, and a forty-
eight hour waiting period for unemancipated minors 3 0 Additionally,
it struck down a one-parent notice requirement based on prior prece-
dent because it did not contain a judicial bypass mechanism.231
In reviewing the constitutionality of the civil and criminal penalty
provisions of the South Dakota abortion statute, the district court re-
lied upon the undisputed facts from the parties' summary judgment
papers.232 With regard to the civil penalty provision providing for
strict liability of $10,000 in damages per violation, the court found the
provision to be an unconstitutional obstacle that "chill[ed] the abor-
tion decision."1233 The court stated that "South Dakota has [only] one
physician providing abortion services. If this statutory provision is al-
lowed to stand, there may not be any provider willing to subject him-
self or herself to the vagaries of the statute.''11 4 Similarly, with regard
to the criminal penalty provision which included penalties of a $100
fine and one year of imprisonment, -35 the court found the provision
"acts as a chilling effect upon a physician's desire to continue perform-
ing abortions. 236 It further explained that "where a basic constitu-
226. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013, 1014 (1993) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
227. Schafer, 18 F.3d at 529.
228. 1993 S.D. Laws 249 ("An Act to Regulate the Performance of Abortion").
229. 860 F. Supp. 1409, 1417-18 (civil penalty provision), 1419-20 (criminal penalty pro-
vision) (D.S.D. 1994). Although the court also struck down the South Dakota one-parent
notification without bypass provision, calling it an "undue burden on the minor's privacy
right to make the abortion decision," it found the provision unconstitutional under long-
standing precedent. Id at 1415-16; see Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir.
1988) (en banc), affd, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
230. Miller, 860 F. Supp. at 1416-17 (48 hour waiting period for unemancipated minors),
1418-19 (informed consent provision), 1420-21 (24 hour waiting period).
231. Id at 1415-16 (citing Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); Planned
Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979);
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).
232. Id at 1413-14 ("Findings of Fact").
233. Id at 1418.
234. Id
235. Id at 1419-20.
236. Id at 1420.
tional right of the female is involved,... the chilling effect becomes
much more significant as it impacts... the ability to find competent
physicians to perform the procedure. '237
Here, in its analysis of the civil and criminal penalty provisions,
the district court relied on specific findings of fact concerning the cir-
cumstances present in South Dakota, and in particular, the significant
effects of having only one in-state abortion provider. This factual as-
sessment generally fits the requirements of the Casey joint opinion. In
upholding the twenty-four hour waiting period and parental consent
provisions, however, the district court engaged in the improper com-
parison of these provisions to the Pennsylvania provisions upheld in
Casey to determine constitutionality.238
b. The Circuit Court Case
In August 1995, the Eighth Circuit decided the appeal in Planned
Parenthood v. Miller and affirmed the district court's decision in all
respects.239 The critical issue on appeal was whether the Casey undue
burden standard had replaced the Salerno test for challenges to the
facial constitutionality of abortion laws.240 Earlier in February 1994,
the Eighth Circuit in Schafer had left this issue an "open question.' 241
Later, in Miller, the court explained that it avoided the issue in Scha-
fer because the result would have been the same no matter which test
it followed.242 In resolving this issue, the Eighth Circuit decided "to
follow what the Supreme Court actually did-rather than what it
failed to say."241 3 In other words, the court found that Casey effec-
tively overruled Salerno for facial challenges to abortion statutes.244
With regard to each reviewed provision, the Eighth Circuit fol-
lowed the basic reasoning laid out by the district court. First, it struck
down the South Dakota one-parent notice provision based on the
well-established precedents that require a judicial bypass mecha-
237. Id
238. See id at 1418-19 (citing similarities to informed consent provisions in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1992),
and Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 1992)), 1420-21 (citing
similarity to Casey provision).
239. 63 F.3d 1452, 1454 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. Apr. 29,
1996) (No. 95-856).
240. Miller, 63 F.3d at 1456-57. This district court applied the Casey undue burden
standard without regard to Salerno.
241. Schafer, 18 F.3d at 529.
242. Miller, 63 F.3d at 1457. The court further explained that although the Miller chal-
lengers could meet the undue burden standard, they would fail under the Salerno test. Id
243. Id at 1458.
244. Id
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nism.245 Second, it struck down both the civil and criminal penalty
provisions for physicians, finding that they "chill the willingness of
physicians to perform abortions in South Dakota. '246 Third, it sum-
marily upheld the informed consent provision reasoning that it was
virtually identical to provisions upheld in Schafer and Casey.247
Therefore, in Miller, the Eighth Circuit mirrored almost exactly the
successes and failures of the district court in its undue burden analysis:
it properly depended upon findings of fact with regard to the civil and
criminal penalty provisions, but improperly decided constitutionality
by comparing the South Dakota informed consent provision to similar
provisions in other states.
C. The Tenth Circuit Cases
1. Jane L. v. Bangerter
a. The District Court Case
In December 1992, a Utah district court decided Jane L. v.
Bangerter,248 in which challengers sought to invalidate the entire Utah
abortion law249 by challenging its central provisions.250 The statute
placed limitations on abortions both before and after viability, with an
exception for instances of grave danger to a woman's health, and re-
quired parental and spousal notification "if possible."2'2 The district
court quickly dispensed with the statute's ban on abortions before via-
bility, based upon Casey's reaffirmation of the essential holding of
Roe: before viability the state interest in protecting potential life is not
strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion . 52
In setting out the standard for a facial challenge to the statute's
postviability abortion prohibition, the court encountered the dilemma
of whether to apply the Salerno test or abandon it as the Casey joint
opinion did in its analysis of spousal notification. 53 Grappling with
this issue, the court noted the joint opinion's own inconsistent han-
245. Id. at 1459-60 (citing Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990), Planned
Parenthood v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983), Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979), and
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).
246. Id. at 1465, 1467.
247. IkL at 1467.
248. 809 F. Supp. 865 (D. Utah 1992). This memorandum decision came after earlier
decisions rendered prior to Casey. See 794 F. Supp. 1528 (D. Utah 1992); 794 F. Supp. 1537
(D. Utah 1992). After Casey, the parties were permitted to file briefs on the impact of
Casey. 809 F. Supp. at 867.
249. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-301 to -325 (1991).
250. 809 F. Supp. at 868.
251. Id- at 868-69 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-7-302, -304, -307, -308, and -315
(1991)).
252. Id at 870.
253. Id. at 871-72.
dling of facial challenge analysis: "In the context of Pennsylvania's
twenty-four hour waiting period statute, the Court appears to have
combined facial challenge analysis with the undue burden test. How-
ever, with regard to the spousal notification statute, the Court did not
determine whether the law had any constitutional applications as Sa-
lerno requires."' 54
Citing this inconsistency in Casey, and Justice Scalia's dissent
from the denial of the petition for certiorari in Ada v. Guam Society of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists' 5 in which he claimed that Casey did
not alter facial challenge analysis, the court decided to implement the
Salerno test. 5 6 Under this standard, the court held that the statute
withstood the facial challenge because "[i]t is clear that the Utah stat-
ute can be applied constitutionally in the vast majority of cases. ' '1 7
Again applying Salerno, the Utah district court found the provi-
sion restricting late, nontherapeutic abortions did not constitute an
undue burden.58 In its discussion, the court noted that such abortions
have never been performed in Utah and doctors generally avoid the
trauma of late abortions." 9 Since the plaintiffs submitted no evidence
that any woman wanted or had attempted to obtain a late abortion,
the court found no undue burden.2 60 Here, the Utah district court
properly depended upon the record and made findings of fact as re-
quired under the Casey.
The court also upheld the statute's choice-of-method provisions
requiring physicians to employ the abortion method that gives the un-
born child the best chance of survival.26' The court based this holding
on the notion that Casey's striking down of Roe's trimester system
overruled prior Supreme Court jurisprudence and increased the im-
portance of the state's interest in potential life.2 62 Finding the Utah
method provisions rationally related to this heightened state interest,
the court found no undue burden.263
In reviewing Utah's spousal notification provision that required a
physician to notify the husband of a woman seeking an abortion, the
court noted its similarity to the Pennsylvania spousal notification pro-
254. L at 871 n.10.
255. 506 U.S. 1011, 1013 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
256. Jane L., 809 F. Supp. at 872.
257. kld at 871-72 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,745 (1987)). The court
stated that this is "because the Utah statutory prohibition of abortions at 21 weeks gesta-
tional age corresponds with the time when the unborn child is capable of independent
existence, being fully developed and simply maturing in the womb." Id. at 872.
258. I& at 873-74.
259. Id. at 873.
260. IM.
261. Id. at 875-76.
262. Id. at 875.
263. Id. at 875-76.
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vision struck down in Casey, and found this notice provision requiring
physicians to give notice directly to the husband, rather than allow
women to tell their husbands, to be "a distinction without a differ-
ence. 264 The court reasoned that "[t]he same abuse from violent and
dangerous husbands could be expected whether the notice comes
from the woman or the woman's physician.1265 Based on this compar-
ison, the court found the provision to be an unconstitutional burden
on the abortion right.266
In Jane L., the district court properly found the previability
prohibitions to be an undue burden without engaging in a factual in-
quiry because the prohibitory purpose of these provisions violated an
essential holding of Roe reaffirmed by Casey. In other words, the
court employed a purpose prong inquiry under the undue burden
standard and found the purpose illegal on its face. In upholding
Utah's restrictions on late, nontherapeutic abortions, the court also
properly relied on factual findings as required by the effect prong of
the undue burden standard. It improperly assessed the constitutional-
ity of the Utah spousal notification requirement, however, by essen-
tially borrowing the evidence presented in Casey and comparing the
provisions of different states.
b. The Circuit Court Case
In August 1995, the Tenth Circuit issued Jane L. v. Bangerter,267
its first opinion reviewing abortion restrictions since Casey. For the
most part, the Tenth Circuit upheld the undue burden analysis of the
district court and reversed only the lower court's ruling on Utah's
choice-of-method provisions.268 The Tenth Circuit rejected the district
court's contention that Casey's striking down of the trimester frame-
work had dislodged well-established precedents based on Roe's tri-
mester system. 269
Instead, the Tenth Circuit found the "importance of maternal
health is a unifying thread that runs from Roe to Thornburgh and then
to Casey," and "[t]he Utah choice of method provisions violate this
consistent strain of abortion jurisprudence." 270 The court further held
that Casey did not disturb Roe's approach to postviability regulation,
264. Id. at 876.
265. Id- The court cited no findings of fact or social science research to support this
notion. See id. at 876-77.
266. Id at 877.
267. 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995), petition for cerL filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Feb. 5,
1996) (No. 95-1242).
268. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1502-05. Other issues involved severability, see id. at 1496-99,
and the statute's ban on fetal experimentation, see id. at 1499-1502.
269. Id. at 1503-04.
270. Id. at 1504.
but instead reaffirmed the state's interest in potential life and its abil-
ity to regulate abortion after viability, as long as exceptions exist for
the life and health of the mother.27'
With the choice-of-methods issue, the Tenth Circuit properly as-
sessed these provisions under the purpose prong of the undue burden
standard, which recognizes the constitutionality of provisions aligned
with the essential holdings of Roe as reaffirmed by Casey. The Tenth
Circuit also let stand without mention the Utah district court's use of
the Salerno test rather than the undue burden standard.
2. Utah Women's Clinic v. Leavitt
In February 1994, prior to Jane L., a Utah district court decided
Utah Women's Clinic v. Leavitt,2 72 upholding the twenty-four hour
waiting period and informed consent requirements of the Utah Abor-
tion Act Revision of 1993.273 In drafting the law, the state legislature
purposefully tailored its provisions after the Pennsylvania restrictions
upheld in Casey to ensure that the Act would pass constitutional mus-
ter.274 In reviewing the constitutionality of these provisions, the dis-
trict court relied heavily upon comparisons between the Utah and
Pennsylvania provisions upheld in Casey. For example, in evaluating
the effect of the twenty-four hour waiting period, which would force
women seeking abortions to make two visits to an abortion clinic in-
stead of one, the court stated that "[b]ecause the two visit require-
ment is constitutional in Pennsylvania, it must also be constitutional in
Utah.,,275
The court also stumbled over the question of how to reconcile the
traditional Salerno test with the new Casey undue burden standard.276
It noted that Casey seemed to have altered the traditional standard for
facial challenges in the abortion context, but that its new standard
changed only "the focus as to whom the law will affect. It does not,
however, change the standard for statutory interpretation under a fa-
cial challenge. 27 7 Following this discussion, the court chose to apply
a type of Salerno-Casey hybrid, holding that to bring a good faith fa-
cial action, the challengers "must reasonably believe that the statute is
incapable of being applied constitutionally" (the gist of Salerno) "in a
large fraction of the cases in which it is relevant" (the language of
Casey).278 The court then summarily found that plaintiffs did not have
271. Id
272. 844 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Utah 1994).
273. UTAH CODE ANNs. § 76-7-305 (1993).
274. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. at 1485-86.
275. Id at 1487.
276. Id at 1488-90.
277. Id at 1489.
278. Id
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this reasonable belief since they conceded that, if the law was inter-
preted to allow the information to be given to women by telephone
rather than requiring a second visit to the abortion facility, it would
not impose an undue burden.2 79 Using its hybrid Salerno-Casey test,
the court upheld the twenty-four hour waiting period and informed
consent requirement, stating that "it would be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to bring a good faith facial challenge." 80
The challengers also argued that the Casey joint opinion relied on
the district court record in making its determinations, and that each
subsequent abortion law must be scrutinized on the individual factual
record before the court.281 The court held that such inquiries were not
required and that such a review would amount to "a futile exercise
unless there is a reasonable expectation that circumstances in the fo-
rum state are materially different from circumstances in Penn-
sylvania."'  The court then reviewed the factual record previously
developed by the magistrate judge, found it in all material respects
identical to the record examined in Casey, and thus constitutional.28 3
Here, the Leavitt court did review the factual record as required
by Casey, but improperly assessed that record by comparing it to the
record used in Casey to uphold the Pennsylvania informed consent
provision. Without the guidance the Casey joint opinion should have
provided by explicitly overruling Salerno in abortion regulation chal-
lenges, the court crafted a hybrid of Salerno and Casey, instead of
properly following the undue burden standard.
D. District Court Cases in Other Circuits
1. Arizona: Planned Parenthood v. Neely
In September 1992, an Arizona district court decided Planned
Parenthood v. Neely, which ruled on the facial constitutionality of an
Arizona statute284 that required parental consent before an abortion
procedure could be performed on an unmarried or unemancipated mi-
nor.285 Although the action was originally brought in August 1989, a
preliminary injunction remained in force and the matter was left
279. Id
280. Id at 1491.
281. Id at 1490.
282. Id The court noted that "[lt could be argued that because Utah is geographically
larger than Pennsylvania, with only one major metropolitan area, the waiting period's bur-
den is greater on rural women in Utah because they have farther to travel to get to the
abortion clinic." Id. at 1491 n.11. The court found this travel burden, however, not to be a
factor in its constitutional inquiry. Id.
283. Id at 1495.
284. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2152, -2153 (1989).
285. 804 F. Supp. 1210, 1213 (D. Ariz. 1992).
pending until Casey. 86
The district court found the statute's medical emergency excep-
tion 287 to be an undue burden absent broader language addressing a
"serious risk" to the "health" of the minor woman." 8 In deciding the
issue, the court cited the Casey joint opinion's determination that the
essential holding of Roe forbids a state from interfering with a wo-
man's choice if continuing her pregnancy would constitute a threat to
her health. 8 9 The court used the Pennsylvania definition of a medical
emergency, which was upheld in Casey, as a measuring stick for the
constitutionality of the Arizona definition. 90
Although the district court found the statute unconstitutional,
and therefore did not reach the issue of the constitutional adequacy of
the statute's judicial bypass procedure, it nevertheless reviewed the
procedure to offer guidance to the state legislature for future drafting
of a revision that would be constitutional. 291 The court stated that the
provision's requirement that a minor file a notice of appeal within
twenty-four hours of receiving an adverse court order was unconstitu-
tional and would place an undue burden on the minor. 9 Moreover,
the court found that without provisions for court-appointed counsel at
all levels of the proceeding, or for the appointment of guardians or
proceedings through a friend, the procedure was inadequate to ensure
an effective opportunity for the minor to obtain judicial permission to
make the abortion decision without parental consent. 93
In its analysis of both the Arizona medical emergency definition
and the judicial bypass procedure, the district court engaged mostly in
a comparison of these Arizona provisions to their Pennsylvania coun-294
terparts. By using this comparative method, the court avoided the
fact-based analysis that Casey mandated and instead merely applied
Casey's specific holdings. This methodology moves abortion law to-
wards consistency among jurisdictions, instead of fostering inconsis-
tency as some predicted. An unexpected advantage resulting from
286. Itd at 1211.
287. Parental consent is not required where "[t]here is an emergency need for an abor-
tion to be performed or induced such that continuation of the pregnancy is an immediate
threat and grave risk to the life of the pregnant woman and the attending physician so
certifies in writing." ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(B)(2).
288. 804 F. Supp. at 1215.
289. Md (citing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)).
290. Id at 1215.
291. Id at 1216.
292. Id at 1217.
293. Id at 1218.
294. Id at 1214-15 (comparing ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(B)(2) with 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3203 (1990)), 1217-18 (comparing ARMz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-
2153(A) with 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(e)).
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this erroneous method is to limit the imposition of the judge's subjec-
tive notions into the abortion law analysis.
2. Recent District Court Rulings on Preliminary Injunctions
a. Montana: Armstrong v. Mazurek
In September 1995, a Montana district court in Armstrong v.
Mazurek denied a motion for injunctive relief brought against a physi-
cians-only provision by three doctors and a physician assistant who
perform abortions in Montana.295 The motion contended that a 1995
amendment to Montana abortion law296 was facially invalid under the
Casey undue burden standard. 297 At issue was a provision which ad-
ded the language: "A physician assistant-certified may not perform an
abortion., 298
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the challengers were required
to demonstrate a strong likelihood of success on the merits, irrepara-
ble injury, and a balance of hardships in their favor.299 In assessing
whether the purpose of the amendment was invalid under Casey, the
court stated that its inquiry was narrow because "'the Constitution
gives the States broad latitude to decide that particular functions may
be performed only by licensed professionals, even if an objective as-
sessment might suggest that those same tasks could be performed by
others."'3 0 The court summarily held that there was insufficient evi-
dence in the record to support finding an undue burden,30' and de-
clined to engage in an analysis of the physician-only provision under
the effect prong of the undue burden standard.
b. Ohio: Women's Medical Professional Corporation v. Voinovich
In December 1995, an Ohio district court issued a preliminary
injunction in Women's Medical Professional Corporation v. Voinovich,
295. No CV-95-083-GF, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20136, at *8-*9 (D. Mont. Sept. 29,
1995). The court, however, enjoined the enforcement of two licensing and advertising pro-
visions previously found unconstitutional in earlier actions on other grounds. Id. at *3.
296. See MoNrr. CODE ANN. §§ 37-20-103, 50-20-109 (1995).
297. Armstrong, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20136, at *7. The challengers also argued that
the amendment is unconstitutional because it violates equal protection law on the basis of
sex, and that it violates the Bill of Attainder Clause since it amounted to legislative punish-
ment directed specifically against the physician assistant challenger because she was the
only physician assistant performing abortions in Montana. Id at *7-*8.
298. MoTr. CODE AN. § 37-20-103 (1995).
299. Armstrong, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20136, at *9 (citing Los Angeles Memorial Col-
iseum Comm'n v. NFL, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980)). Alternatively, challengers
could obtain the injunction by demonstrating either a combination of probable success and
irreparable harm, or "that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tip
sharply in [their] favor." Id. (citing Coliseum Comm'n, 634 F.2d at 1201).
300. Id. at *18 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)).
301. Id. at *18-*19.
which enjoined a 1995 abortion act302 that contained a viability-testing
requirement and banned performing postviability abortions or the di-
lation and extraction procedure. 0 3 In determining which standard to
apply in assessing the facial constitutionality of state abortion laws,
the court noted that the undue burden standard used in Casey "ap-
peared to signal a new approach. '30 4 The court decided to follow the
Casey approach, rather than use the Salerno test, for two reasons: in
the Casey analysis of the spousal notification provision, the challeng-
ers were not required to show that no set of circumstances existed
under which the law would be invalid; and secondly, as a practical
matter it would be impossible to find an undue burden without exam-
ining specific facts in the record.305
The court found the challengers had shown a substantial likeli-
hood that they would succeed on the merits in their challenges to all
three provisions.30 6 In its assessment of the ban on the dilation and
extraction procedure, the court engaged in an extensive review of ex-
pert testimony and found the procedure to be potentially the safest
abortion procedure, and banning it would have the unconstitutional
effect of forcing a significant number of women having abortions to
undergo riskier procedures that might endanger their health. 0 7 Re-
garding the ban on postviability abortions, the court found the provi-
sion unconstitutional because, based on the record, it would prevent
postviability abortions that might be necessary to preserve the health
of pregnant women and thus violated an essential holding of Roe as
reaffirmed in Casey.3 Is Lastly, the court found the viability testing re-
302. OHIO REV. CODE ANN § 2919.11-.19 (Anderson 1995).
303. 911 F. Supp. 1051, 1057 (S.D. Ohio 1995). The standard used by the court in issu-
ing the injunction required consideration of four factors: the substantial likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits, whether irreparable harm would be caused by not issuing it, whether
others would be harmed by the injunction, and whether the injunction would serve the
public interest. IM. at 1059 (citing International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Norfolk South-
ern Corp., 927 F.2d 900, 903 (6th Cir. 1991)).
304. Id. at 1061.
305. Id at 1061-62. The court noted that the traditional Salerno test, besides being
inapplicable to previability restrictions, should also not be applied in the postviability con-
text because the standard is too strict in cases which involve laws that threaten severe and
irreparable harm, and because it would be unconscionable to hold that a pregnant woman
may not challenge a postviability restriction until after she is unconstitutionally deprived of
her life or health. Id at 1062.
306. Id. at 1093. The challengers also proved that the injunction would save abortion
patients from irreparable harm, not harm others, and serve the public interest. Id at 1091-
92.
307. Id at 1070.
308. Id at 1087. This ban contained a definition of "serious risk of the substantial and
irreversible impairment of a major bodily function," which the court found too narrow to
meet constitutional standards because of its potential negative effects on the mental and
emotional health of women and fathers. Id at 1080.
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quirement unconstitutionally void for vagueness.30 9
Here, the Voinovich court properly engaged in an undue burden
analysis under the effect prong in its evaluation of the statute's ban on
the abortion procedure. First, the court undertook extensive factfind-
ing, which demonstrated the ban's effect would be to force a signifi-
cant number of the relevant class of women having abortions to
undergo riskier procedures that could potentially endanger their
health. Second, in its assessment of the statute's ban on postviability
abortions, the court also engaged in an analysis under the effect prong
of Casey. The court examined factual evidence at length, and then
concluded that the effect of the ban would be to prevent postviability
abortions which might be necessary to preserve the health of pregnant
women, an unconstitutional effect under Roe as reaffirmed by Casey.
c. Indiana: A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman
In November 1995, an Indiana district court issued a preliminary
injunction enjoining enforcement of the 1995 amendment to the in-
formed consent provision of Indiana's abortion statute3 10 in A Wo-
man's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman.31' Specifically,
the amendment added mandatory disclosure and waiting period re-
quirements to the informed consent provision, provided that a woman
seeking an abortion must be given certain medical information and
information concerning alternatives to abortion at least eighteen
hours before an abortion, and added a definition of medical
emergency.312
To obtain a preliminary injunction, the challengers were required
to demonstrate some likelihood that they would succeed on the mer-
its, that they would suffer irreparable harm without the injunctive re-
lief, and that no adequate remedy at law existed.313 The court found
the Casey undue burden standard controlling for this analysis,31 4 and
stated that the joint opinion's handling of the Pennsylvania spousal
notification provision illustrated the type of showing required to meet
an undue burden analysis in a facial challenge.315 In accepting the
Casey standard, the court noted that the statement of the undue bur-
den standard and its application by the joint opinion seemed inconsis-
309. Id at 1090-91. Specifically, the provision's definitions of nonviability and medical
emergency were found to be unconstitutionally vague. Id
310. IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1 (1995).
311. 904 F. Supp. 1434 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
312. Id at 1440-41.
313. Id. at 1442 (citing Abbott Lab. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 11 (7th Cir.
1992)).
314. Id at 1445-46.
315. Id at 1447.
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tent with the traditional Salerno test:3 16
It is true that Casey did not expressly overrule or limit Salerno.
However, the Casey Court's actions and statements conflict with
the standard stated in Salerno. Casey is very closely on point
here, and more recent. In addition, Justices O'Connor and Sou-
ter have indicated clearly in the Fargo case and in Casey on re-
mand that a law "constitutes an undue burden, and hence is
invalid, if, 'in a large fraction of the cases in which [the law] is
relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman's
choice to undergo an abortion."' Therefore, like the Third and
Eighth Circuits, this court believes that Casey effectively dis-
placed Salerno's application to abortion laws. ev7
By following the model set out by the Casey joint opinion in its analy-
sis of spousal notification, the Indiana district court embarked on an
effect prong analysis of the undue burden standard, relying exten-
sively on the expert testimony submitted by the parties at hearing. 18
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing, the court found
the amendment's mandatory requirement that women be informed in
person and not by telephone constituted an imposition of a two-trip
requirement.3 19 The court also found that the information require-
ment would have prevented an estimated eleven to fourteen percent
of women from obtaining abortions, which it considered the measure
of the law's burden upon the abortion right.3 20 The court derived that
percentage from data collected by an expert witness in Mississippi, the
only state where a law with a two-trip requirement had been in effect
long enough such that data could be developed to evaluate the law's
effect.32 1 Additionally, the court found that the magnitude of this ef-
fect was sufficient to satisfy the undue burden standard because
eleven to fourteen percent was "a significant fraction of women who
would otherwise choose to have abortions. '322 The court also deter-
mined that the Mississippi statute had this unconstitutional effect be-
cause of its burdens on the right to an abortion, rather than the
persuasive effects of the delay and that information was disseminated
to the women in person. 3
316. I1&
317. I& (citations omitted).
318. Id. at 1449-62.
319. Id. at 1459.
320. Id. at 1457.
321. Id. at 1454. The Mississippi law contained disclosure and delay requirements simi-
lar to those required under the Indiana amendment, and the court accepted the challeng-
ers' argument that this Mississippi data provided the best e ,idence available for measuring
potential effects of the amendment in Indiana. Id.
322. Id. at 1457.
323. Id. at 1458.
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In its ruling on a motion for preliminary injunction, the Newman
court went further than any previous court in undertaking a full analy-
sis under the effect prong of the Casey undue burden test. First, it
dispensed with the Salerno test. Second, it scrutinized the Indiana law
at hand independent of any comparison to the Pennsylvania provi-
sions in Casey. Third, it developed an extensive record of evidence
from expert testimony and relied on it for establishing the law's effect.
Fourth, it made findings of fact with regard to the relevant class of
those women who would otherwise obtain abortions. Lastly, it found
that where the law would affect a significant number of women within
the relevant class in such a way that it would likely prevent those wo-
men from obtaining abortions, a substantial obstacle exists.
E. Third Circuit Law on the Application of the Undue
Burden Standard
In Casey, the United States Supreme Court remanded the case
with the instruction to engage in "proceedings consistent with this
opinion, including consideration of the question of severability. '324
Following this course, the Third Circuit then determined that the un-
constitutional spousal notification and corresponding recordkeeping
provisions were severable from the remainder of the Pennsylvania
abortion provisions, and remanded to the district court "for such fur-
ther proceedings as may be appropriate." 31 The district court then
granted the challengers' motion to reopen the record and continue the
stay.326 This ruling was appealed by Pennsylvania; the Third Circuit
reversed the district court's order and remanded with instructions to
enter the final judgment.327
In this last opinion, the Third Circuit provided its view on three
crucial features of an undue burden analysis. First, it found that "[a]t
a minimum, we believe the Court meant that other state abortion laws
require individualized application of the undue burden standard. '328
The court found this view bolstered by Justice O'Connor's Fargo con-
currence, which stated "the joint opinion specifically examined the
record developed in the district court in determining that Penn-
sylvania's informed consent provision did not create an undue bur-
den.... I believe the lower courts should have undertaken the same
analysis." 329 The Third Circuit, therefore, believed an independent
factual assessment of each state's provisions would be required even
324. 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
325. Casey, 978 F.2d 74,78 (3d Cir. 1992). The severability of these provisions allowed
the remainder of the statute to stand. Id-
326. Casey, 822 F. Supp. 227, 236 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
327. Casey, 14 F.3d 848, 863 (3d Cir. 1994).
328. Id. at 861.
329. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013, 1013 (1993).
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though these provisions in language might be substantially similar to
the Pennsylvania provisions upheld in Casey.
Second, the Third Circuit believed by limiting its holdings to the
record developed by the district court, the Casey joint opinion meant
that a future "as applied" challenge to the Pennsylvania abortion stat-
ute would be possible to allow the challengers to prove that the law in
practice imposed an undue burden on the abortion right.33 0 Third, the
court believed Casey established a new standard for facial challenges
to previability abortion laws that made the old Salerno rule
inapplicable.331
IV. An Evaluation of the Predicted Problems and an
Analysis of the Circuit Court Split Over the Use
of Salerno
A. The Predicted Problems
1. The Lack of Guidance Predictions
Several of the major predictions made by the commentators have
in fact been realized in these thirteen lower court cases involving the
constitutionality of state abortion regulations under the Casey undue
burden standard. It is not a surprise that the broadest criticism-that
Casey's joint opinion offered too little guidance on how to implement
the standard332-has been a theme throughout these cases.
The most unresolved issue created by this lack of guidance is the
threshold question of whether Casey did away with the Salerno test in
abortion law challenges. This threshold issue has stopped several
courts from ever reaching an undue burden analysis.
For the most part, the courts have been grappling with the larger
components of an undue burden analysis, such as whether to develop
a factual record under an effect prong inquiry. The prediction that
Casey's own internal inconsistencies would cause courts to forego a
factual analysis and instead merely apply the specific holdings of
Casey has frequently appeared.333 In fact, it seems that where chal-
lenged provisions were substantially similar to Casey's, there has been
a strong tendency for the courts to note the similarity and sometimes
directly decide constitutionality on that basis.
The prediction that the ambiguity of the undue burden standard
would lead to an increase in litigation seems to have been incorrect.
As a practical matter, it appears that the driving force behind the
amount of litigation is not anything inherent to the standard that, as
330. Casey, 14 F.3d at 861-62.
331. Id. at 863 n.21.
332. Metzger, supra note 102, at 2035.
333. Id at 2037-38.
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predicted, would require abortion legislation to be relitigated in an
effort to gain clarity. Instead, the number of challenges is in direct
proportion to the number of abortion restrictions passed by the state
legislatures, since with each newly enacted abortion restriction comes
a challenge. If an increase in litigation can be construed to mean
longer and more complex cases, however, this prediction is probably
accurate given the extensive findings of fact required under the stan-
dard's effect prong.
2. The Judicial Discretion Predictions
With the exception of Barnes v. Mississippi,334 there has so far
been no significant example of judicial bias and speculation infecting
an undue burden analysis. Of course, the nature of bias is that it oper-
ates below the conscious level of statements which enter the actual
text of an opinion. Therefore, other than the obvious examples of
presumptions concerning families and family life that were demon-
strated in Barnes v. Mississippi, this prediction is better left to the em-
pirical research of the social scientists.
Overall, the prediction that broad judicial discretion would lead
to disparate outcomes in different states on similar facts has not oc-
curred. This is because several courts have relied upon a comparison
of each provision to its Pennsylvania counterpart to determine its con-
stitutionality. Such a method, albeit improper, has reduced the variety
of outcomes among the law of different states. As courts apply more
extensive factual analyses, as is the trend, inconsistencies may increase
in the future.
B. An Analysis of the Circuit Court Split Over the Use of Salerno
Ironically, the question with the greatest consequence for abor-
tion regulation challenges is also one which was never predicted by
the commentators: whether to apply the traditional Salerno facial test
or recognize that Casey set a new standard for facial challenges in the
abortion context. The root of this problem lies in the fact that the
joint opinion did not explicitly overrule the Salerno test. In its effect-
prong analysis of the Pennsylvania spousal notification provision,
however, the joint opinion demonstrated for the lower courts that the
standard had been radically altered.33 5 Also, it was subsequently
made clear by Justice O'Connor in her Fargo concurrence, and by Jus-
tice Souter in his in-chambers opinion, that the joint opinion had not
required plaintiffs to meet the Salerno standard in challenges to state
abortion regulations.336 Because of the confusion created by the joint
334. 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 468 (1993).
335. See supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
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opinion's failure to provide more explicit guidance, however, the cir-
cuit courts are split over the practical issue of whether to apply the
Salerno test.
1. The Traditional Salerno Test, as Opposed to the Undue
Burden Standard
In United States v. Salerno, Chief Justice Rehnquist reiterated the
traditional standard by writing "[a] facial challenge to a legislative Act
is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since
the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid. '337 If this heavy burden is met by chal-
lengers, a statute is rendered entirely invalid.338 Following Salerno,
the Court subsequently held this facial standard to apply to state abor-
tion laws in a trilogy of cases.33 9 First, in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services,340 the Court applied Salerno to a law prohibiting the
use of public facilities to perform abortions except when necessary to
save the life of the mother. Second, in Ohio v. Akron Center for Re-
productive Health,"41 the Court applied the test to a judicial bypass
procedure for minors seeking abortions without parental consent.
And finally, in Rust v. Sullivan,342 the Court applied the test to regula-
tions affecting abortion and family planning counseling.
With the 1992 Casey decision, the Court changed course with the
joint opinion's pronouncement of the undue burden standard as the
new measuring stick for the constitutionality of abortion regula-
tionsA43 In contrast to Salerno, the undue burden standard would find
a state regulation invalid if, "in a large fraction of the cases in which
[the law] is relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a wo-
man's choice to undergo an abortion." 344 The undue burden standard,
therefore, lowered the threshold burden challengers must meet from
the almost unreachable heights of the Salerno test and the trend estab-
lished in the Webster-Akron-Rust trilogy. If this trend had continued,
today the constitutionality of abortion laws would most likely be scru-
337. 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (emphasis added). An exception to this rule was carved
out for statutes which are violative on First Amendment free speech grounds under the
overbreadth doctrine. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-23 (1972).
338. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. In Salerno, the Court upheld the federal Bail Reform Act
after finding the plaintiffs' showing that the Act might operate unconstitutionally under
some conceivable set of circumstances insufficient to render the statute facially invalid. 1d.
339. See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L.
Rv. 235, 271-76 (1994) (arguing Salerno is generally inconsistent with the Court's abor-
tion cases).
340. 492 U.S. 490, 524 (1989).
341. 497 U.S. 502, 514 (1990).
342. 500 U.S. 173, 183 (1991).
343. 505 U.S. at 869-79.
344. kL at 895.
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tinized under a simple rational basis review. Instead, the Casey joint
opinion has provided a unique form of heightened scrutiny for review-
ing abortion laws.
Two members of the Court who did not join in Justice
O'Connor's Casey concurrence have expressed a contrary view on Sa-
lerno's continuing applicability. First, in his Casey dissent, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist argued that "because this is a facial challenge to the
[Pennsylvania] Act, it is insufficient for petitioners to show that the
[spousal] notification provision 'might operate unconstitutionally
under some conceivable set of circumstances."'345 Second, Justice
Scalia, in Ada v. Guam Society of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, dis-
sented from the Court's denial of certiorari in a case striking down as
facially unconstitutional a Guam law that banned all abortions except
in cases of medical emergency3 46 In this dissent, Justice Scalia con-
tended that in Casey the Court "did not purport to change this well-
established rule." 7
Immediately following Casey, these dissenting voices supporting
the use of the traditional Salerno test in the abortion context were
apparently not strong enough to build a quorum of members sufficient
to overcome the Casey standard. This is the obvious implication of
the Court's denial of certiorari in Ada: the Guam law was inconsistent
with the principles of Roe and the application of Casey, and therefore
unconstitutional.348 Four years after Casey, this small number of dis-
senting voices supporting the use of Salerno in facial challenges to
abortion regulations remains insufficient even to secure a granting of
certiorari when the Court is "squarely presented" with the circuit
split.349
2. A Summary of the Circuit Court Split
A circuit split has developed over whether to continue applying
the traditional Salerno test in determining the facial constitutionality
of state abortion laws after Casey. The lower courts have considered
this threshold issue in eight of the thirteen cases implementing the
345. Id at 972-73 (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined
by Scalia & Thomas, JJ.).
346. 506 U.S. 1011, 1011 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari, joined by Rehn-
quist, C.J., and White, J.) ("That [denial] seems to me wrong, since there are apparently
some applications of the statute that are perfectly constitutional.").
347. Id. at 1013.
348. Doff, supra note 339, at 237.
349. Planned Parenthood v. Miller, cerL denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3724, 3725 (U.S. Apr. 29,
1996) (No. 95-856) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari, joined by Rehnquist,
CJ., and Thomas, J.).
undue burden standard in abortion law challenges.350 The issue has
risen to the appellate level in the Third,351 Fifth,352 and Eighth353 Cir-
cuits. Also, three currently active court cases in the states of Ohio,3 54
Indiana,355 and Montana356 may cause the issue to be reviewed by the
Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits during the next few years.
The Third Circuit's view is that Casey established a new standard
for facial challenges to previability abortion laws which made the old
Salerno rule inapplicable.357 The Eighth Circuit's arrival at this same
conclusion was more circuitous. First, in Fargo,358 despite Justice
O'Connor's instructive concurrence, it left the issue of Salerno's appli-
cability to abortion laws an "open question. ' 359 The court avoided
deciding the issue because under its alternative analyses of the provi-
sions up for review, the result would have been the same under Casey
or Salerno.3 60 Later, in Miller, the applicability of the Salerno test be-
350. These cases are: Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1996) (No. 95-856); Fargo Women's Health Org.
v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993), denying application for stay and injunction pending appeal
'from 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994); Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cerL
denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992); Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F.
Supp. 1051 (S.D. Ohio 1995); A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman,
904 F. Supp. 1434 (S.D. Ind. 1995); Causeway Medical Suite v. Ieyoub, 905 F. Supp. 360
(E.D. La. 1995); Utah Women's Clinic v. Leavitt, 844 F. Supp. 1482 (D. Utah 1994); Jane L.
v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865 (D. Utah 1992).
The cases which did not discuss the applicability of the Salerno test are: Jane L. v.
Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995),petition for cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Feb.
5, 1996) (No. 95-1242); Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 468 (1993); Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert denied, 507 U.S.
972 (1993); Armstrong v. Mazurek, No. CV-95-083-GF, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20136, at
*8-*9 (D. Mont. Sept. 29, 1995); Planned Parenthood v. Neely, 804 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Ariz.
1992); Preterm Cleveland v. Voinovich, 627 N.E.2d 570 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
351. Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 14 F.3d 848 (3d Cir. 1994).
352. Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 468 (1993);
Sojourner T. v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 972 (1993);
Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992).
353. Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64
U.S.L.W. 3724 (U.S. Apr. 29, 1996) (No. 95-856); Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer,
507 U.S. 1013 (1993), denying application for stay and injunction pending appeal from 18
F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994).
354. Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Ohio
1995).
355. A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434 (S.D.
Ind. 1995).
356. Armstrong v. Mazurek, No. CV-95-083-GF, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20136, at *8-*9
(D. Mont. Sept. 29, 1995).
357. Casey, 14 F.3d at 863 n.21; see supra notes 324-331 and accompanying text.
358. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 507 U.S. 1013 (1993), denying application
for stay and injunction pending appeal from 18 F.3d 526 (8th Cir. 1994).
359. Fargo, 18 F.3d at 529.
360. Miller, 63 F.3d at 1457.
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came the critical issue.361 In resolving this issue, the Eighth Circuit
decided "to follow what the Supreme Court actually did-rather than
what it failed to say," and found Salerno effectively overruled in the
abortion regulation context.362
The Tenth Circuit in Jane L. upheld the district court's findings
which used the Salerno test in determining the facial constitutionality
of the Utah abortion regulations,363 and let stand without mention its
use of the Salerno test rather than the undue burden standard. It is
not clear, however, that the Tenth Circuit in fact agreed with the use
of Salerno since the issue was not raised by the parties on appeal. In
the Tenth Circuit, therefore, the applicability of Salerno is currently an
open question. A Utah district court in Leavitt had previously
avoided an all-or-nothing decision of which standard to use by creat-
ing a Salerno-Casey hybrid. Additionally, this issue will not likely
come before the Tenth Circuit any time soon, since no current litiga-
tion is pending in any court within the circuit.36
The Fifth Circuit was the first United States Court of Appeals to
decide the Salerno issue. In Barnes v. Moore, it acknowledged that
Casey may have applied a somewhat different standard in striking
down the spousal notification provision, but chose instead to apply the
traditional Salerno test. 65 In making this determination, the Fifth
Circuit cited Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Casey,,66 and stated
that it did not interpret Casey as having overruled the Salerno test in
the abortion context 6s7 Although the recent Ieyoub district court
case3 68 was decided within Fifth Circuit boundaries and might possibly
arise on appeal, it is unlikely that this would provide the Fifth Circuit
with an opportunity to revisit the Salerno issue. As the Ieyoub court
noted, since the parental consent provision clearly violated the Bellotti
v. Baird requirements for a judicial bypass mechanism, the outcome
would have been the same under either the Salerno or Casey standard.
361. Id at 1456-57.
362. Id. at 1458.
363. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995), petition for cerL filed, 64
U.S.L.W. 3561 (U.S. Feb. 5, 1996) (No. 95-1242).
364. Search of LEXIS, Genfed library, DIST file (Apr. 30, 1996).
365. 970 F.2d 12, 14 n.2 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 506 U.S. 1021 (1992).
366. Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d at 14. In Casey, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote "be-
cause this is a facial challenge to the Act, it is insufficient for petitioners to show that the
notification provision 'might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of cir-
cumstances."' 505 U.S. 833, 972 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)). Instead, he stated, "they must 'show
that no set of circumstances exists under which the [provision] would be valid."' Id. at 973
(quoting Akron I, 497 U.S. 502, 514 (1990)). The Chief Justice further stated that "[t]he
joint opinion ... appears to ignore this point in concluding that the spousal notice provi-
sion imposes an undue burden on the abortion decision." Id. at 973 n.2.
367. Barnes v. Moore, 970 F.2d at 14 n2.
368. 905 F. Supp. 360 (E.D. La. 1995).
Outside those circuits already discussed, the Salerno issue re-
cently arose in two other district court cases. In both cases, the courts
easily dismissed the applicability of Salerno and chose to follow the
model of the undue burden standard as set out in the Casey joint opin-
ion. First, in Voinovich,3 69 the Ohio district court noted that the un-
due burden standard used in Casey "appeared to signal a new
approach.'370 The court decided to follow Casey rather than Salerno
because in Casey the spousal notification analysis did not require the
challengers to show that there was no set of circumstances under
which the law would be invalid,371 and as a practical matter it would
be impossible to find an undue burden without examining the factual
record.372 If after the final decision in Voinovich the parties choose to
appeal, the Sixth Circuit may receive its first opportunity to decide the
Salerno issue.
Second, in Newman,373 the Indiana district court found the Casey
undue burden standard controlling for its analysis.3 74 If Newman later
arrives at the Seventh Circuit on appeal, it will be difficult for the
court to avoid a discussion and ruling on Salerno given the breadth of
treatment it received by the Indiana district court.
In recent district courts of first impression, therefore, there ap-
pears to be a trend to dispense with Salerno and apply Casey. It seems
likely that this trend in district courts of first impression will continue
as this body of pro-Casey case law is refined. As is apparent from
Voinovich and Newman, the arguments in support of the position that
Casey overruled Salerno in facial challenges of state abortion regula-
tion are becoming more elaborate and persuasive. Against this back-
ground, the primary argument in support of applying Salerno-that
Casey did not expressly overrule Salerno-rings flat and unconvincing.
V. Conclusion
In June 1992, the United States Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey struck down the trimester framework of Roe v.
Wade and replaced it with an undue burden standard to test the con-
stitutionality of state abortion regulations. After Casey, commenta-
tors predicted the standard would be unworkable in practice,
engender confusion in the lower courts, increase abortion litigation,
369. Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, 911 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D. Ohio
1995).
370. Id at *17.
371. Id at *17-*18.
372. I& at *18.
373. A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434 (S.D.
Ind. 1995).
374. See supra notes 314-318, and accompanying text.
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allow judges broad discretion, and create inconsistent outcomes from
state to state. After a survey of the thirteen cases which have so far
implemented the undue burden standard, there is little evidence of the
accuracy of these predictions, with the exception that the courts have
been confused widely about the requirements of this new standard.
The greatest problem that has arisen was unpredicted: the thresh-
old question of whether Casey implicitly overruled the traditional Sa-
lerno test for facial challenges to abortion restrictions. A split on this
issue has developed among the Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits. The
trend, however, in these circuit courts as well as district courts of first
impression outside of these circuits, is clearly toward dispensing with
Salerno and applying the undue burden standard. In practical terms,
this trend means that challenges to newly enacted state abortion re-
strictions prior to implementation will meet with increased success in
future cases.
